In economics, game theory, and decision theory the expected utility hypothesis is a theory of utility in which "betting preferences" of people with regard to uncertain outcomes (gambles) are represented by a function of the payouts (whether in money or other goods), the probabilities of occurrence, risk aversion, and the different utility of the same payout to people with different assets or personal preferences. This theory has proved useful to explain some popular choices that seem to contradict the expected value criterion (which takes into account only the sizes of the payouts and the probabilities of occurrence), such as occur in the contexts of gambling and insurance. Daniel Bernoulli initiated this theory in 1738. Until the mid twentieth century, the standard term for the expected utility was the moral expectation, contrasted with "mathematical expectation" for the expected value.
The von Neumann–Morgenstern utility theorem provides necessary and sufficient "rationality" axioms under which the expected utility hypothesis holds.
Read more about Expected Utility Hypothesis: Expected Value and Choice Under Risk, Bernoulli's Formulation, Infinite Expected Value — St. Petersburg Paradox, Criticism
Famous quotes containing the words expected, utility and/or hypothesis:
“What strikes me as odd now is how much my father managed to get across to me without those heart-to-hearts which I’ve read about fathers and sons having in the study or in the rowboat or in the car.... Somehow I understood completely how he expected me to behave, in small matters as well as large, even though I can’t remember being given any lectures about it beyond the occasional, undramatic “You might as well be a mensch.””
—Calvin Trillin (20th century)
“Moral sensibilities are nowadays at such cross-purposes that to one man a morality is proved by its utility, while to another its utility refutes it.”
—Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900)
“The hypothesis I wish to advance is that ... the language of morality is in ... grave disorder.... What we possess, if this is true, are the fragments of a conceptual scheme, parts of which now lack those contexts from which their significance derived. We possess indeed simulacra of morality, we continue to use many of the key expressions. But we have—very largely if not entirely—lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality.”
—Alasdair Chalmers MacIntyre (b. 1929)