Deterrence Theory - Psychology and Deterrence

Psychology and Deterrence

A new form of criticism emerged in the late 1980s with detailed analyses of the actions of individual leaders and groups of leaders in crisis situations (historical and theoretical).

A number of new or nuanced criticisms of "traditional" deterrence theory emerged. One was that deterrence theory assumed that both sides had common rational peaceful goals. In some real-life situations, such as the Yom Kippur War, leaders felt that internal or external political considerations forced a conflict. One of the essays in, regarding the internal military and political discussions within the Egyptian high command in 1973, indicates that senior civilian leaders (including Anwar Sadat) believed that they had to fight a war in order to have enough internal political support to negotiate for peace.

In another miscalculation, Israel rationalized that the Israeli military dominance would deter any attack, and believed that no rational Syrian or Egyptian leader would attempt such an attack. Sadat felt unable to avoid a war, and Syria's leadership misjudged the military situation and believed they could be victorious. Israel assumed rational and well-informed opponents with clear objectives, and its deterrence failed.

Another observation is that crisis situations can reach a point whereby formerly stabilizing actions such as keeping military units at bases, and low alert levels can be seen as a sign of weakness, which may provoke an enemy to attack during the perceived time of advantage. Thus, an inversion point exists, after which some seemingly stabilizing actions become destabilizing, and some formerly destabilizing actions become stabilizing.

Finally, studies of the specific group psychology of several leaders and leader groups, including the Israeli and Arab leaders in 1973 and the Kennedy Administration during the Bay of Pigs Invasion and Cuban Missile Crisis, indicated that in many cases executive groups use poor decision-making techniques and improperly assess available information. These errors can preclude truly rational end-behavior in deterrence situations.