Deterrence Theory

Deterrence Theory

In foreign affairs, deterrence refers to the use of the threat of military action to compel an adversary to do something, or to prevent them from doing something, that another state desires. Deterrence theory gained increased prominence as a military strategy during the Cold War with regard to the use of nuclear weapons. And, it took on a unique connotation during this time as an inferior nuclear force, by virtue of its extreme destructive power, could deter a more powerful adversary -- provided that this force could be protected against destruction by a surprise attack. A credible nuclear deterrent, Brodie wrote, must be always at the ready, yet never used.

In Thomas Schelling’s (1966) classic work on deterrence, the concept that military strategy can no longer be defined as the science of military victory is presented. Instead, it is argued that military strategy was now equally, if not more, the art of coercion, of intimidation and deterrence.

Thomas Schelling goes on to explain the foundations of deterrence theory based on diplomacy. Diplomacy between states is defined as a form of bargaining that seeks outcomes for each state that though not ideal for either party, are better for both than other alternatives. In order for diplomacy to succeed, there must be some common interest, if only in the avoidance of mutual damage. Traditionally in military strategy, mutual pain and suffering are among the results of warfare, however they have also been incidental and not the primary purpose. In the development of military strategy however, Schelling (1966) argues the capacity to hurt another state is now used as a motivating factor for other states to avoid it and influence another state's behaviour. In order to be coercive or deter another state, violence has to be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation. It can therefore be summarised that the use of the power to hurt as bargaining power is the foundation of deterrence theory, and is most successful when it is held in reserve.

More recent scholarship has made the case that deterrence theory is logically inconsistent, not empirically accurate and deficient as a theory. In place of classical deterrence, rational choice scholars have argued for "perfect deterrence," which assumes that states may vary in their internal characteristics and especially in the credibility of their threats of retaliation.

In a January 2007 article in the Wall Street Journal, veteran cold-war policy makers Henry Kissinger, Bill Perry, George Shultz and Sam Nunn reversed their previous position and asserted that far from making the world safer, nuclear weapons had become a source of extreme risk.