John McDowell - Publications

Publications

• “Identity Mistakes: Plato and the Logical Atomists”, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society lxx (1969–70), 181-95
• Plato, Theaetetus, translated with notes (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973)
• “Comment” (on a paper by F.B. Fitch), in Stephan Körner, ed., Philosophy of Logic (Blackwell, Oxford, 1976), pp. 196–201
• (with Gareth Evans) “Introduction”, in Gareth Evans and John McDowell, eds., Truth and Meaning (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1976), pp. vii-xxiii; translated into Spanish: “Introducción a Verdad y Significado”, Cuadernos de Crítica 37 (1984)
• “Truth Conditions, Bivalence, and Verificationism”, ibid, pp. 42–66
• “On the Sense and Reference of a Proper Name”, Mind lxxxvi (1977), 159-85; reprinted in Mark Platts, ed., Reference Truth and Reality (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1980), pp. 141–66, and in A. W. Moore, ed., Meaning and Reference (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993), pp. 111–36; translated into Spanish: “Sobre el Sentido y la Referencia de un Nombre Propio”, Cuadernos de Crítica 20 (1983)
• “On ‘The Reality of the Past’”, in Christopher Hookway and Philip Pettit, eds., Action and Interpretation (CUP, Cambridge,1978), pp. 127-44
• “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?”, Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume lii (1978), 13-29
• “Physicalism and Primitive Denotation”, Erkenntnis xiii (1978), 131-52; reprinted in Platts, ed., op. cit., pp. 111–30
• “Virtue and Reason”, The Monist lxii (1979), 331-50; reprinted in Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson, eds., Anti-Theory in Ethics and Moral Conservatism (SUNY Press, Albany, 1989), pp. 87–109
• “Quotation and Saying That”, in Platts, ed., op. cit., pp. 206–37
• “Meaning, Communication, and Knowledge”, in Zak van Straaten, ed., Philosophical Subjects: Essays on the Work of P. F. Strawson (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1980), pp. 117–39
• “The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle’s Ethics”, Proceedings of the African Classical Associations xv (1980), 1-14; reprinted in Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, ed., Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics (University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London, 1980), pp. 359–76
• “Anti-Realism and the Epistemology of Understanding”, in Herman Parret and Jacques Bouveresse, eds., Meaning and Understanding (De Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1981), pp. 225–48
• “Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following”, in Steven Holtzman and Christopher Leich, eds., Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1981), pp. 141–62
• “Falsehood and Not-Being in Plato’s Sophist”, in Malcolm Schofield and Martha Craven Nussbaum, eds., Language and Logos: Studies in Ancient Greek Philosophy presented to G. E. L. Owen (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982), pp. 115–34
• “Truth-Value Gaps”, in Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science VI (North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1982), pp. 299–313
• “Reason and Action, III”, Philosophical Investigations v (1982), 301-5
• (Editor) Gareth Evans, The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1982)
• “Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge”, Proceedings of the British Academy lxviii (1982), 455-79; reprinted in part in Jonathan Dancy, ed., Perceptual Knowledge (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988)
• “Aesthetic Value, Objectivity, and the Fabric of the World”, in Eva Schaper, ed., Pleasure, Preference and Value (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983), pp. 1–16
• “Wittgenstein on Following a Rule”, Synthese 58 (1984), 325-363; reprinted in Moore, ed., Meaning and Reference, pp. 257–93
• “De Re Senses”, Philosophical Quarterly xxxiv (1984), 283-94; also in Crispin Wright, ed., Frege: Tradition and Influence (Blackwell, Oxford, 1984), pp. 98-l09
• “Values and Secondary Qualities”, in Ted Honderich, ed., Morality and Objectivity (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1985), pp. 110–29
• “Functionalism and Anomalous Monism”, in Ernest LePore and Brian McLaughlin, eds., Actions and Events: Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Blackwell, Oxford, 1985), pp. 387–98
• “Critical Notice: Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, by Bernard Williams”, Mind xcv (1986), 377-86
• (with Philip Pettit) “Introduction”, in Philip Pettit and John McDowell, eds., Subject, Thought and Context (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986), pp. 1–15
• “Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space”, ibid, pp. 137–68
• “In Defence of Modesty”, in Barry Taylor, ed., Michael Dummett: Contributions to Philosophy (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1987), pp. 59–80
• Projection and Truth in Ethics (1987 Lindley Lecture), published by the University of Kansas
• “Comments on T. H. Irwin’s ‘Some Rational Aspects of Incontinence’”, Southern Journal of Philosophy xxvii, Supplement (1988), 89-102
• “One Strand in the Private Language Argument”, Grazer Philosophische Studien 33/34 (1989), 285-303
• “Mathematical Platonism and Dummettian Anti-Realism”, Dialectica 43 (1989), 173-92
• “Wittgenstein and the Inner World”, Journal of Philosophy lxxxvi (1989), 643-4
• “Peacocke and Evans on Demonstrative Content”, Mind xcix (1990), 311-22
• “John Leslie Mackie, 1917-1981”, in Proceedings of the British Academy lxxvi (1990), 487-98
• “Intentionality De Re”, in Ernest LePore and Robert van Gulick, eds. John Searle and His Critics (Blackwell, Oxford, 1991), pp. 215–25
• “Intentionality and Interiority in Wittgenstein”, in Klaus Puhl, ed., Meaning Scepticism (De Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1991), pp. 148–69
• “Putnam on Mind and Meaning”, Philosophical Topics xx (1992), 35-48
• “Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy”, in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr., and Howard K. Wettstein, eds., Midwest Studies in Philosophy Volume XVII: The Wittgenstein Legacy (University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1992), pp. 40–52
• “Knowledge by Hearsay”, in B. K. Matilal and A. Chakrabarti, eds, Knowing from Words (Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1993; Synthese Library vol. 230), pp. 195–224
• “The Content of Perceptual Experience”, Philosophical Quarterly xliv (1994), 190-205
• Mind and World (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1994; reissued with a new introduction, 1996)
• “Might there be External Reasons”, in J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison, eds., World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995), pp. 68–85
• “Eudaimonism and Realism in Aristotle’s Ethics”, in Robert Heinaman, ed., Aristotle and Moral Realism (University College London Press, London, 1995), pp. 201–18
• “Knowledge and the Internal”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research lv (1995), 877-93
• “Deliberation and Moral Development in Aristotle”, in Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting, eds., Aristotle, Kant and the Stoics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), pp. 19–35
• “Two Sorts of Naturalism”, in Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence, and Warren Quinn, eds., Virtues and Reasons: Philippa Foot and Moral Theory (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996), pp. 149–79; translated into German (“Zwei Arten von Naturalismus”), Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie v (1997), 687-710
• “Précis of Mind and World”, in Enrique Villanueva, ed., Perception: Philosophical Issues, 7 (Ridgeway, Atascadero, 1996), pp. 231–9
• “Reply to Gibson, Byrne, and Brandom”, ibid, pp. 283–300
• “Reply to Price”, Philosophical Books 38 (1997), 177-81
• “Brandom on Representation and Inference”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research lvii (1997), 157-62
• “Another Plea for Modesty”, in Richard Heck, Jnr., ed., Language, Thought, and Logic: Essays in Honour of Michael Dummett (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997), pp. 105–29
• “Reductionism and the First Person”, in Jonathan Dancy, ed., Reading Parfit (Blackwell, Oxford, 1997), pp. 230–50
• Mind, Value, and Reality (a collection of papers) (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1998)
• Meaning, Knowledge, and Reality (a collection of papers) (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1998)
• “Some Issues in Aristotle’s Moral Psychology”, in Stephen Everson, ed., Companions to Ancient Thought: 4: Ethics (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998), pp. 107–28
• “Referring to Oneself”, in Lewis E. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson (Open Court, Chicago and Lasalle, 1998), pp. 129–45
• “Response to Crispin Wright”, in Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith, and Cynthia Macdonald, eds., Knowing Our Own Minds (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1998), pp. 47–62.
• “Précis of Mind and World” and “Reply to Commentators”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research lviii (1998), 365-8 and 403-31
• “The Constitutive Ideal of Rationality: Davidson and Sellars”, Crítica xxx (1998), 29-48
• “Having the World in View: Sellars, Kant, and Intentionality” (The Woodbridge Lectures, 1997), The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 95 (1998), 431-91
• “Comment on Hans-Peter Krüger’s paper”, Philosophical Explorations i (1998), 120-5 (comment on Hans-Peter Krüger, “The Second Nature of Human Beings: an Invitation for John McDowell to discuss Helmuth Plessner’s Philosophical Anthropology”, ibid 107-19).
• “Sellars’s Transcendental Empiricism”, in Julian Nida-Rümelin, ed., Rationality, Realism, Revision (Proceedings of the 3rd international congress of the Society for Analytical Philosophy), Walter de Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 1999, pp. 42–51.
• “Scheme-Content Dualism and Empiricism”, in Lewis E. Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Donald Davidson (Open Court, Chicago and Lasalle, 1999), pp. 87–104
• “Comment” on Robert B. Brandom, “Some Pragmatist Themes in Hegel’s Idealism”, European Journal of Philosophy vii (1999), 190-3.
• “Evans, Gareth (1946-80)”: entry in the new Routledge and Kegan Paul Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
• “Towards Rehabilitating Objectivity”, in Robert B. Brandom, ed., Rorty and His Critics (Blackwell, Malden, Mass. and Oxford, 2000), pp. 109–23
• “Experiencing the World” and “Responses”, in Marcus Willaschek, ed., John McDowell: Reason and Nature: Lecture and Colloquium in Münster 1999 (LIT Verlag, Münster, 2000), pp. 3–17, 93-117
• “Comment on Richard Schantz, ‘The Given Regained’”, in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research lxii (2001), 181-5
• “Comments”, in The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology xxi (2000), 330-43 (a special issue devoted to my work)
• “Scheme-Content Dualism and Empiricism”, in Petr Kotatko, Peter Pagin, and Gabriel Segal, eds., Interpreting Davidson (Stanford: CSLI Publications, 2001), 143-54. (This is a shorter version of the paper previously published in the Davidson LLP volume.)
• “L’idealismo di Hegel come radicalizzazione di Kant”, in Iride 34 (2001), 527-48. (Translation of the paper I gave at the Venice Hegel conference in May 2001.)
• “Knowledge and the Internal Revisited”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research lxiv (2002), 97-105.
• “Moderne Auffassungen von Wissenschaft und die Philosophie des Geistes”, in Johannes Fried und Johannes Süssmann, Herausg., Revolutionen des Wissens: Von der Steinzeit bis zur Moderne (München: C. H. Beck, 2001), 116-35. (Previously published in Philosophische Rundschau.)
• “Gadamer and Davidson on Understanding and Relativism”, in Jeff Malpas, Ulrich Arnswald, and Jens Kertscher, eds., Gadamer’s Century: Essays in Honor of Hans-Georg Gadamer (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), 173-94.
• “Responses” in Nicholas Smith, ed., Reading McDowell: Mind and World (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), pp. 269–305. (Responses to the contributions.)
• “How not to read Philosophical Investigations: Brandom’s Wittgenstein”, in R. Haller and K. Puhl, eds., Wittgenstein and the Future of Philosophy: A Reassessment after 50 Years (Vienna: Holder, Pichler, Tempsky, 2002), pp. 245–56.
• “Non-cognitivisme et règles”, in Archives de Philosophie 64 (2001), 457-77. (Translation of my old paper “Non-cognitivism and rule-following”.)
• “Knowledge and the Internal Revisited”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research lxiv (2002), 97-105.
• Wert und Wirklichkeit: Aufsätze zur Moralphilosophie (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2002). (Translation by Joachim Schulte, with an Introduction by Axel Honneth and Martin Seel, of seven of the papers in my Mind, Value, and Reality.)
• “Hyperbatologikos empeirismos”, Defkalion 21/1, June 2003, 65-90. (Translation into Greek of “Transcendental Empiricism”, paper delivered at the Pitt/Athens symposium in Rethymnon, Crete, in 2000.)
• “Subjective, intersubjective, objective”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research lxvii (2003), 675-81. (Contribution to a symposium on a book by Donald Davidson.)
• Mente y Mundo (Spanish translation by Miguel Ángel Quintana-Paz of Mind and World), Salamanca: Ediciones Sígueme, 2003.
• “L’idealismo di Hegel come radicalizazzione di Kant”, in Luigi Ruggiu and Italo Testa, eds., Hegel Contemporaneo: la ricezione americana di Hegel a confronto con la traduzione europea (Milan: Guerini, 2003). (Previously in Iride for December 2001.)
• “Naturalism in the philosophy of mind”, in Mario de Caro and David Macarthur, eds., Naturalism in Question (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2004), 91-105. (Previously published in German translation as “Moderne Auffassungen von Wissenschaft und die Philosophie des Geistes”, see above.)
• “Reality and colours: comment on Stroud”, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research lxviii (2004), 395-400. (Contribution to a symposium on a book by Barry Stroud.)
• “The apperceptive I and the empirical self: towards a heterodox reading of ‘Lordship and Bondage’ in Hegel’s Phenomenology”, Bulletin of the Hegel Society of Great Britain 47/48, 2003, 1-16.
• “Hegel and the Myth of the Given”, in Wolfgang Welsch und Klaus Vieweg, Herausg., Das Interesse des Denkens: Hegel aus heutiger Sicht (München: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 2003), pp. 75–88.