Consistency and Completeness in Arithmetic and Set Theory
In theories of arithmetic, such as Peano arithmetic, there is an intricate relationship between the consistency of the theory and its completeness. A theory is complete if, for every formula φ in its language, at least one of φ or ¬ φ is a logical consequence of the theory.
Presburger arithmetic is an axiom system for the natural numbers under addition. It is both consistent and complete.
Gödel's incompleteness theorems show that any sufficiently strong effective theory of arithmetic cannot be both complete and consistent. Gödel's theorem applies to the theories of Peano arithmetic (PA) and Primitive recursive arithmetic (PRA), but not to Presburger arithmetic.
Moreover, Gödel's second incompleteness theorem shows that the consistency of sufficiently strong effective theories of arithmetic can be tested in a particular way. Such a theory is consistent if and only if it does not prove a particular sentence, called the Gödel sentence of the theory, which is a formalized statement of the claim that the theory is indeed consistent. Thus the consistency of a sufficiently strong, effective, consistent theory of arithmetic can never be proven in that system itself. The same result is true for effective theories that can describe a strong enough fragment of arithmetic – including set theories such as Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory. These set theories cannot prove their own Gödel sentences – provided that they are consistent, which is generally believed.
Because consistency of ZF is not provable in ZF, the weaker notion relative consistency is interesting in set theory (and in other sufficiently expressive axiomatic systems). If T is a theory and A is an additional axiom, T + A is said to be consistent relative to T (or simply that A is consistent with T) if it can be proved that if T is consistent then T + A is consistent. If both A and ¬A are consistent with T, then A is said to be independent of T.
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—Walter Benjamin (1892–1940)
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