Revealed Preference - Criticism

Criticism

Stanley Wong argued that revealed preference theory was a failed research program. According to Wong, in 1938 Samuelson presented revealed preference theory as an alternative to utility theory, while in 1950, Samuelson took the demonstrated equivalence of the two theories as a vindication for his position, rather than as a refutation.

If there exist only an apple and an orange, and an orange is picked, then one can definitely say that an orange is revealed preferred to an apple. In the real world, when it is observed that a consumer purchased an orange, it is impossible to say what good or set of goods or behavioral options were discarded in preference of purchasing an orange. In this sense, preference is not revealed at all in the sense of ordinal utility. One of the critics of the revealed preference theory states that "Instead of replacing 'metaphysical' terms such as 'desire' and 'purpose'" they "used it to legitimize them by giving them operational definitions." Thus in psychology, as in economics, the initial, quite radical operationalist ideas eventually came to serve as little more than a "reassurance fetish" for mainstream methodological practice."

Counter Example: Given that I prefer the second cheapest flower in a set of flowers {x,y}, then C{x, y} = {x}. If a less expensive flower is added to the set then C{x,y,z} = {y}, which contradicts WARP. Sen 1993, p 501 lays out an explicit argument.