Phronesis
Phronēsis (Greek: φρόνησις) is an Ancient Greek word for wisdom or intelligence which is a common topic of discussion in philosophy. In Aristotelian Ethics, for example in the Nicomachean Ethics it is distinguished from other words for wisdom and intellectual virtues – such as episteme and techne – as the virtue of practical thought. For this reason, when it is not simply translated by words meaning wisdom or intelligence, it is often translated as "practical wisdom", and sometimes (more traditionally) as "prudence", from Latin prudentia. Phronesis is also sometimes spelled Fronesis.
Aristotle defines phronesis in the following manner:
| “ | We may grasp the nature of prudence if we consider what sort of people we call prudent. Well, it is thought to be the mark of a prudent man to be able to deliberate rightly about what is good and advantageous . . . But nobody deliberates about things that are invariable . . . So . . . prudence cannot be science or art ; not science because what can be done is a variable (it may be done in different ways, or not done at all), and not art because action and production are generically different. For production aims at an end other than itself; but this is impossible in the case of action, because the end is merely doing well. What remains, then, is that it is a true state, reasoned, and capable of action with regard to things that are good or bad for man . . . We consider that this quality belongs to those who understand the management of households or states. | ” |
Thus for Aristotle episteme concerns practical wisdom, and those possessing practical wisdom (phronimos) have a knowledge about how to achieve the highest aims, in ways that cannot be reduced to scientific knowledge of general truths, nor to technical know-how about how to get morally neutral things done.
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