German Attitude To War
On July 2, the Saxon Ambassador in Berlin wrote back to his king that the German Army wanted Austria to attack Serbia as quickly as possible because the time was right for a general war since Germany was more prepared for war than either Russia or France. On July 3, the Saxon military attaché in Berlin reported that the German General Staff “would be pleased if war were to come about now”.
Kaiser Wilhelm II declared on July 4 that he was entirely for “settling accounts with Serbia”. He ordered the German ambassador in Vienna, Count Heinrich von Tschirschky, to stop advising restraint, writing that “Tschirschky will be so good to drop this nonsense. We must finish with the Serbs, quickly. Now or never!”. In response, Tschirschky told the Austro-Hungarian government that same day that “Germany would support the Monarchy through thick and thin, whatever action it decided to take against Serbia. The sooner Austria-Hungary struck, the better”. On July 5, 1914, Count Moltke, the Chief of the German General Staff, wrote that “Austria must beat the Serbs”.
In order to ensure Germany's full support, the permanent head of the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry Count Alexander von Hoyos visited Berlin on July 5. He provided Austro-Hungarian Ambassador Count Ladislaus de Szögyény-Marich with two documents, one of which was a memo by Tisza, advising that Bulgaria should join the Triple Alliance, and another letter by Franz Josef stating that the only way of preventing the disintegration of the Dual Monarchy was “to eliminate Serbia” as a state. The letter by Franz Josef was based closely upon Berchtold’s June 14 memo calling for the destruction of Serbia. Franz Josef’s letter explicitly stated that the decision for war against Serbia had been made before the assassination of the Archduke, and that the events of Sarajevo only confirmed the already pre-existing need for a war against Serbia.
After meeting with Szögyény on July 5, the German Emperor informed him that his state could “count on Germany’s full support”, even if “grave European complications” ensued, and that Austria-Hungary “ought to march at once” against Serbia. He added that “in any case, as things stood today, Russia was not at all ready for war, and would certainly think long before appealing to arms”. Even if Russia were to act in defence of Serbia, Wilhelm promised that Germany would do everything in its power, including war, to support Austria-Hungary.
After his meeting, Szögyény reported to Vienna that Wilhelm “would regret it if we let this present chance, which was so favourable for us, go by without utilising it”. This so-called “blank cheque” of German support up to and including war was to be the main determining factor in Austrian policy in July 1914. At a meeting held also on the 5th at Potsdam palace, the German Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann Hollweg, the Foreign Ministry’s State Secretary Arthur Zimmermann, the Minister of War Erich von Falkenhayn, the head of the German Imperial Military Cabinet Moritz von Lyncker, the Adjutant general Hans von Plessen, Captain Hans Zenker of the Naval General Staff, and Admiral Eduard von Capelle of the Naval State Secretariat all endorsed Wilhelm’s “blank cheque” as Germany’s best policy. When asked if Germany was ready for a war against Russia and France, Falkenhayn replied with a “curt affirmative”. Later on July 17th, the Army’s Quartermaster general Count Waldersee wrote to the Foreign Minister von Jagow: “I can move at a moment’s notice. We in the General Staff are ready: there is nothing more for us to do at this juncture”.
Within Serbia, there was much popular rejoicing over the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. Because Serbian elections were scheduled for August 14, the Prime Minister Pašić was unwilling to court unpopularity by being seen to bow down to Austria. If his attempts to warn the Austrians in advance of the plot against Franz Ferdinand leaked out, Pašić was concerned about his chances at the polls and perhaps his life being endangered.
Germany's policy was to support a swift war to destroy Serbia that would present a fait accompli to the world. Unlike the three earlier cases going back to late 1912 where Austria had asked for German diplomatic support for a war against Serbia, this time it was felt that political conditions for such a war now existed. At this time, the German military supported the idea of an Austrian attack against Serbia as the best way of starting a general war, whereas Wilhelm believed that an Austro-Serbian war would be purely local. Austrian policy based upon pre-existing plans to destroy Serbia involved not waiting to complete judicial inquiries or striking back immediately and not to strain its credibility in the coming weeks as it would become more and more clear that Austria was not reacting to the assassination. Likewise, Germany wished to give the impression of its ignorance of Austrian intentions.
As Wilhelm himself stated in private that “In order not to alarm world opinion”, the Kaiser left on his annual North Sea cruise. Shortly after, Wilhelm's close friend Gustav Krupp von Bohlen wrote that the Emperor had told him:
“He would declare war at once, if Russia mobilized. This time people would see that he was not “falling out”. The Emperor’s repeated protestations that in this case no one would ever again be able to reproach him with indecision were almost comic to hear”
In the same way, Berchtold suggested that Austrian leaders go on vacation “to prevent any disquiet” about what had been decided.
On July 6, Bethmann Hollweg and Zimmermann further repeated the promise of Wilhelm’s “blank cheque” at a conference with Szögyény. Although Bethmann Hollweg stated that the decision for war or peace was in Austria’s hands, he strongly advised that Austria choose the former.
On July 6, the British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey was warned by the German Ambassador in London, Prince Lichnowsky of the dangerous situation in the Balkans. Grey felt that Anglo-German co-operation could resolve any Austro-Serbian dispute, and that he “believed that a peaceful solution would be reached”.
Read more about this topic: July Crisis
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