Foundationalism - Criticisms

Criticisms

Critics of foundationalism often argue that for a belief to be justified it must be supported by other beliefs; in Donald Davidson's phrase, "only a belief can be a reason for another belief". For instance, Wilfrid Sellars argued that non-doxastic mental states cannot be reasons, and so noninferential warrant cannot be derived from them. Similarly, critics of externalist foundationalism argue that only mental states or properties the believer is aware of could make a belief justified.

According to skepticism, there are no beliefs that are so obviously certain that they require support from no other beliefs. Even if one does not accept this very strong claim, foundationalists have a problem with giving an uncontroversial or principled account of which beliefs are self-evident or indubitable.

Postmodernists and Post-Structuralists such as Richard Rorty and Jacques Derrida have attacked foundationalism on the grounds that the truth of a statement or discourse is only verifiable in accordance with other statements and discourses. Rorty in particular elaborates further on this, claiming that the individual, the community, the human body as a whole have a 'means by which they know the world' (this entails language, culture, semiotic systems, mathematics, science etc.). Thereof, the philosopher, in order to verify a particular means, or a particular statement belonging to a certain means (e.g. the propositions of the natural sciences) would have to 'step outside' the means they are judging and critique them neutrally, in order to provide a foundation for adopting them. However, this is quite literally impossible, the only way in which one can know the world is through the means by which they know the world, a method cannot justify itself. This argument can be seen as directly related to Wittgenstein's Theory of Language, drawing a parallel between Postmodernism and late Logical Positivism that is united in critique of foundationalism.