Transitional Arguments
In epistemology, transitional arguments attempt to show that a particular explanation is better than another because it is able to make sense of a transition from old to new. That is, if explanation b can account for the problems that existed with explanation a, but not vice versa, then b is regarded to be the more reasonable explanation. A common example in the history of science is the transition from pre-Galilean to Galilean understandings of physical motion.
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Famous quotes containing the words transitional and/or arguments:
“Postmodernism is, almost by definition, a transitional cusp of social, cultural, economic and ideological history when modernism’s high-minded principles and preoccupations have ceased to function, but before they have been replaced with a totally new system of values. It represents a moment of suspension before the batteries are recharged for the new millennium, an acknowledgment that preceding the future is a strange and hybrid interregnum that might be called the last gasp of the past.”
—Gilbert Adair, British author, critic. Sunday Times: Books (London, April 21, 1991)
“‘Tis happy, therefore, that nature breaks the force of all sceptical arguments in time, and keeps them from having any considerable influence on the understanding. Were we to trust entirely to their self-destruction, that can never take place, ‘till they have first subverted all conviction, and have totally destroy’d human reason.”
—David Hume (1711–1776)