Revolt of The Admirals - Result of Congressional Hearings

Result of Congressional Hearings

In its final report, the House Armed Services Committee found no substance to the charges relating to the roles of Johnson and his aide Stuart Symington in aircraft procurement. It held that evaluation of the B-36's worth was the responsibility of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, and that the services jointly should not pass judgment on weapons proposed by one service. On cancellation of the supercarrier, the committee questioned the qualifications of the army and air force chiefs of staff, who had testified in support of Johnson's decision, to determine vessels appropriate for the navy. The committee, disapproving of Johnson's "summary manner" of terminating the carrier and his failure to consult congressional committees before acting, stated that "national defense is not strictly an executive department undertaking; it involves not only the Congress but the American people as a whole speaking through their Congress. The committee can in no way condone this manner of deciding public questions."

The author of the so-called "anonymous document" turned out to be Cedric R. Worth, civilian assistant to the Under Secretary of the Navy. A House Investigating Committee recommended that Worth be fired. Following a naval court of inquiry, Worth was dismissed.

The committee expressed solid support for effective unification, but stated that "there is such a thing as seeking too much unification too fast" and observed that "there has been a navy reluctance in the interservice marriage, an over-ardent army, a somewhat exuberant air force... It may well be stated that the committee finds no unification Puritans in the Pentagon."

Finally, the committee condemned the dismissal of Admiral Denfeld. Secretary of the Navy Francis P. Matthews fired Denfeld on October 27, 1949, explaining that he and Denfeld disagreed widely on strategic policy and unification. The House Armed Services Committee concluded that Denfeld's removal was a reprisal because of his testimony, and a challenge to effective representative government.

Army General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, called the navy admirals "'fancy dans' who won't hit the line with all they have on every play unless they can call the signals" who were in "open rebellion against the civilian control." This was as much for budgetary reasons as any other; the services were then in the middle of the post-World War II drawdown (which would continue into and past the Korean War era) and each military branch believed that their future depended on securing as many missions for themselves as possible.