Type physicalism (also known as reductive materialism, type identity theory, mind-brain identity theory and identity theory of mind) is a physicalist theory, in philosophy of mind. It asserts that mental events can be grouped into types, and can then be correlated with types of physical events in the brain. For example, one type of mental event like "mental pains" will, presumably, turn out to be describing one type of physical event (like C-fiber firings).
Type physicalism is contrasted by token identity physicalism. Token identity physicalism argues that mental events are unlikely to have "steady" or categorical biological correlates. These positions make use of the philosophical Type–token distinction (e.g. having the same type of car need not mean that you and your friend share a token, a single vehicle). Type physicalism can now be understood to argue that there is identicalness between types, whereas token identity physicalism says we are only describing a particular, unique, brain event.
There are other ways a physicalist might criticize type physicalism; Eliminative materialism and Revisionary materialism question whether science is currently using the best categorisations. In the same way talk of demonic possession was questioned with scientific advance, categorisations like "pain" may need to be revised.
Read more about Type Physicalism: Background, Versions of Type Identity Theory, See Also
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