Task Force Faith - Chinese Attacks and Isolation

Chinese Attacks and Isolation

However, during the night, powerful Chinese forces – which had infiltrated the area undetected – made a surprise attack on the task force elements as well as the Marines, inflicting heavy casualties and forcing the postponement, though not the cancellation, of the planned offensive. The following afternoon General Almond and his aide, 1st Lt. Alexander Haig, flew into the perimeter of RCT-31. Despite all the evidence of massive Chinese intervention, Almond exhorted the soldiers to begin the offensive. "The enemy who is delaying you for the moment is nothing more than remnants of Chinese divisions fleeing north" he told the soldiers, "We're still attacking and we're going all the way to the Yalu. Don't let a bunch of Chinese laundry-men stop you." The corps commander then flew back to Hagaru-ri, convinced that RCT-31 was strong enough to begin its attack and deal with whatever "remnants" of CCF forces were in their way. Although large numbers of Chinese troops were seen moving south all day, on the hills east of the task force position, U.S. officers did not change their view of the situation. MacLean still expected reinforcements: his second infantry battalion (2-31) and the 31st Tank Company.

The reinforcements did not arrive. The PLA 80th Division reinforced with the 242nd Regiment from the 81st Division, both from the elite PLA 27th Corps, had – unbeknownst to MacLean – completely surrounded the task force, cutting it off from the south, where they established a strong roadblock a few miles north of the Marine base at the ruined village of Hagaru-ri. When the tank company reached the south end of the reservoir and moved north past Hagaru-ri, it was stopped by the Chinese roadblock, losing four tanks to enemy fire. The next day, it tried again, this time with scratch infantry support from headquarters and service troops of the 31st Infantry and 57th Field Artillery, but it was again beaten back. This force then returned to the position they had occupied at Hudong, a small, abandoned village north of Hagaru-ri, about 4 miles (6.5 km) south of RCT-31.

The Marines – surrounded and under heavy attack – had been unable to give assistance to the Army relief effort. MacLean's expected infantry battalion never made it to the Chosin area at all. MacLean was unaware of this and for some reason he made no effort to establish communications with higher headquarters and report his situation using Capt. Edward Stamford's (the Marine air controller) radio.

During the night of 28 November, the Chinese again struck the task force, overrunning several positions, again inflicting many casualties. Chinese prisoners indicated the 80th division and elements of another, likely the 81st. The Chinese attacked 1/32's position with North Korean tanks and self-propelled guns (they were destroyed both by air strikes as well as infantry weapons). The weather conditions deteriorated rapidly. The temperature plunged as low as -30 degrees F (-34 C), as heavy snow fell, impeding mobility. Visibility was low and the troops were suffering from the intense cold (several men froze to death in their foxholes). Colonel MacLean decided to pull his lead battalion, the 1/32 Infantry, back into the perimeter of his other units a few miles to the south, to provide a stronger defense.

All the rest of the day 1/32 moved under cover of Marine and Navy planes from VMF-212, VMF-214, VMF-312, VMF(N)-513, and Hedron-12. At the same time, the PLA 27th Corps committed the 241st Regiment from the 81st Division into the area. Thousands of enemy troops moving south made excellent targets. In addition to the cover afforded by F4U Corsair fighter-bombers, much-needed supplies were dropped by the Air Force Combat Cargo Command. At times, Capt. Stamford found himself directing both air drops from cargo planes and close support strikes over the same radio net. The air was filled with cargo planes, chutes, and agile Corsairs.

Finally, 1/32 joined the casualty-ridden 3/31 after 40 Marine aircraft had hit the enemy with some 225 rockets, 18 napalm tanks, 10 500-lb bombs, and 29 fragmentation bombs. This ordnance was delivered from early morning until the last flight left its station at 1705.

During this withdrawal, MacLean saw what he thought were his long awaited reinforcements, but as he approached them they turned out to be Chinese, who shot MacLean several times and took him prisoner; he died four days later. Lieutenant Colonel Don Faith, commander of 1/32, now took command. Reaching the southern position, he consolidated the task force into one defensive perimeter as the Chinese intensified their attacks. With the assistance of Marine Corps air support – expertly coordinated by Capt. Stamford and without which the task force would have been overwhelmed – RCT 31 fought off heavy assaults by the PLA 80th and 81st divisions for another two days, inflicting severe losses on the communist forces who left hundreds of bodies in the snow around the army position. During the day Stamford directed 38 sorties, making this the major effort of the 1st Marine Air Wing for the day. From 0645 until 1830 Marine planes attacked the Chinese, dropping 21 napalm tanks, 16 500-lb bombs, 21 fragmentation bombs, and firing 190 rockets. All attacks on the perimeter were repulsed.