Rita V. United States - Majority Opinion

Majority Opinion

Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), a district court

shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider—

(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant,

(2) the need for the sentence imposed—

(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for the offense;

(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;

(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and

(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner,

(3) the kinds of sentences available,

(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for—

(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set forth in the guidelines—

(i) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 (a)(1) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such guidelines by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994 (p) of title 28); and

(ii) that, except as provided in section 3742 (g), are in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced; or

(B) in the case of a violation of probation or supervised release, the applicable guidelines or policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 (a)(3) of title 28, United States Code, taking into account any amendments made to such guidelines or policy statements by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994 (p) of title 28),

(5) any pertinent policy statement—

(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to section 994 (a)(2) of title 28, United States Code, subject to any amendments made to such policy statement by act of Congress (regardless of whether such amendments have yet to be incorporated by the Sentencing Commission into amendments issued under section 994 (p) of title 28); and

(B) that, except as provided in section 3742 (g), is in effect on the date the defendant is sentenced,

(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among defendants with similar records who have been found guilty of similar conduct, and

(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense.

In United States v. Booker, the Court ruled that this statute implicitly required the federal courts of appeals to review sentences for "reasonableness." This presumption is not irrebuttable, yet it "reflects the fact that, by the time an appeals court is considering a within-Guidelines sentence on review, both the sentencing judge and the Sentencing Commission will have reached the same conclusion as to the proper sentence in a particular case. That double determination significantly increases the likelihood that the sentence is a reasonable one."

The presumption also reflects the "nature of the Guidelines-writing task that Congress set for the commission and the manner in which the Commission carried out that task." Just as the sentencing judge must implement the seven statutory factors, the Sentencing Commission must write guidelines that carry out those same objectives. The Commission wrote guidelines to carry out the statutory objectives, and it continues to do so, based on empirical evidence of over 10,000 sentences imposed in federal criminal cases. Sentencing judges will, in turn set forth their reasons for the particular sentence they imposed, whether within or outside of the Guidelines range. When the judge imposes a sentence within the Guidelines range, his or her balancing of the statutory factors coincides with the Commission's. That is the source of the presumption of reasonableness.

The presumption does not create a Sixth Amendment violation because it does not require the sentencing judge to impose a sentence within the Guidelines range, even if it will ultimately have the effect of encouraging judges to impose within-Guidelines sentences more frequently. Somewhat counterintuively, because the Sixth Amendment violation occurs when a judge imposes a sentence higher than she would otherwise be able to based on "jury-determined facts standing alone," there is no Sixth Amendmdent violation because a presumption of reasonableness does not require a judge to impose a sentence above whatever would be the Guidelines range based solely on the jury's findings.

Nor may the appellate courts adopt a presumption of unreasonableness as a corollary to the presumption of reasonableness the Court has sanctioned. Finally, the fact that the Commission and the sentencing judge have agreed on the range in which the sentence should fall strongly suggests that the sentence is "sufficient, but not greater than necessary."

Although the sentencing judge must state his reasons for the sentence, that statement need not be particularly long or detailed. In Rita's case, because the arguments before the judge were "straightforward" and "conceptually simple," did not demand a full-blown opinion. Whether a lengthier opinion will be necessary becomes clear in the context of a particular case. In this way the public and the defendant will be reassured that the judicial process is transparent and worthy of trust. Here, the sentencing judge listened to both sides' arguments, considered the supporting evidence, and imposed a sentence that took into account the facts that Rita had worked in the immigration service, served in the military for 25 years, and earned 35 medals, awards, or nominations.