Research Exemption - Common Law Research Exemption

Common Law Research Exemption

The common law research exemption is an affirmative defense to infringement where the alleged infringer is using a patented invention for research purposes. The doctrine originated in the 1813 decision by Justice Joseph Story appellate decision Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 Fed. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813). Story famously wrote that the intent of the legislature could not have been to punish someone who infringes "merely for experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the machine to produce its described effects." Subsequent decisions later distinguished between commercial and non-commercial research.

In 2002, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit dramatically limited the scope of the research exemption in Madey v. Duke University, 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002). The court did not reject the defense, but left only a "very narrow and strictly limited experimental use defense" for "amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry." The court also precludes the defense where, regardless of profit motive, the research was done "in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s legitimate business." In the case of a research university like Duke University, the court held that the alleged use was in furtherance of its legitimate business, and thus the defense was inapplicable.

In Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. 545 U.S. 193 (2005), the United States Supreme Court held that the use of patented compounds in preclinical studies is protected under 35 U.S.C §271(e)(1) if there is a reasonable basis to believe that the compound tested could be the subject of an FDA submission and if the experiments will produce the types of information relevant to an Investigational New Drug or New Drug Application.