Pospolite Ruszenie - Decline

Decline

Szlachta from regions like the Commonwealth's eastern and southern borderlands, where combat was common, created fairly competent units, while those from peaceful regions of the Commonwealth lacked battle experience and training compared to regular-military troops or mercenaries. In time, pospolite ruszenie became increasingly amateurish and inefficient when compared to professional soldiers; Bardach notes that this process can be seen as early as the Thirteen Years' War (1454–66). In addition to the lack of training, discipline and unstandardized equipment, the time it took for a pospolite ruszenie to be called to arms and gathered in a designed spot (often, close to a month) was also a problem. Some attempts at reform the situation, including a mass wave of estate confiscations at 1497, and a requirement for yearly gatherings and reviews, did little to ameliorate the situation.

From the 15th century, pospolite ruszenie levies were used less often than were professional military troops. By mid-16th century, pospolite ruszenie could, in theory, have fielded about 50,000 troops.

By the 17th century, the military value of the pospolite ruszenie was very limited, and was last called to participate in the Battle of Warsaw of 1656 during The Deluge (the battle ended with a Polish defeat). Nonetheless, the szlachta continued to believe they formed an elite army, and that their participation in the defense of the country was an important reason for their privileged position in it. As this was used as a justifications for lower taxation, the Commonwealth treasury found itself increasingly starved for funds to pay to regular, standing army. With the Commonwealth Army reduced by that time to around 16,000, it was easy for its neighbors to overpower its armies (the Imperial Russian Army numbered 300,000; the Prussian Army and Imperial Austrian Army, 200,000).