Definition
In classical logic (as well as intuitionistic logic and most other logics), contradictions entail everything. This curious feature, known as the principle of explosion or ex contradictione sequitur quodlibet (Latin, "from a contradiction, anything follows") can be expressed formally as
| Premise | |
| conjunctive elimination | |
| weakening | |
| conjunctive elimination | |
| disjunctive syllogism |
Which means: if P and its negation ¬P are both assumed to be true, then P is assumed to be true, from which it follows that at least one of the claims P and some other (arbitrary) claim A is true. However, if we know that either P or A is true, and also that P is not true (that ¬P is true) we can conclude that A, which could be anything, is true. Thus if a theory contains a single inconsistency, it is trivial—that is, it has every sentence as a theorem. The characteristic or defining feature of a paraconsistent logic is that it rejects the principle of explosion. As a result, paraconsistent logics, unlike classical and other logics, can be used to formalize inconsistent but non-trivial theories.
Read more about this topic: Paraconsistent Logic
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