Maurice Gamelin - Role in World War II

Role in World War II

When war was declared in 1939, Gamelin was France's commander in chief. France saw little action during the Phoney War, save a few French divisions crossing the German border in the Saar Offensive who travelled a mere 8 km (5.0 mi). They stopped and did not even penetrate Germany's unfinished Siegfried Line. According to General Siegfried Westphal, German staff officer on the western front, if France had attacked in September 1939, German forces could not have held out for more than one or two weeks. Gamelin ordered his troops back behind the Maginot Line, but only after telling France's ally, Poland, that France had broken the Siegfried Line and that help was on its way. Gamelin's long-term strategy was to wait until France had fully rearmed and for the British and French armies to build up their forces, even though this would mean waiting until 1941. He prohibited bombing the industrial areas of the Ruhr in case the Germans retaliated.

Gamelin's vision for France's defense was based upon a static defense along the Franco-German border, which was reinforced by the Maginot Line. However, the Maginot Line was only 87 mi (140 km) long and did not extent towards to Belgian frontier. During the winter of 1939/40, which was one of the coldest of the century, work on the extension to the Maginot Line along the Belgian frontier was slow and not of the same quality as the original one. Gamelin, along with many members of the French High Command, saw the Ardennes as impenetrable and chose to defend it with only ten reserve divisions and few fortifications. The best part of the French army was situated against the north of the Belgian frontier. According to General von Manteuffel, the German Panzer commander, France had more and better tanks than Germany, but chose to disperse them.

The defensive approach of the Maginot Line became out of step with Gamelin's own views. He favoured an aggressive advance northward into Belgium and the Netherlands to meet the attacking German forces—as far removed from French territory as possible. This strategy, known as the Dyle Plan, fitted with Belgian defence plans and British objectives. Gamelin committed much of the motorized forces of the French Army and the entire British Expeditionary Force to this strategy. Such a strategy also meant that the best part of the French Army would leave their one-year old prepared defensive positions in northern France to commit in a meeting battle on an unknwon Belgian defensive line.

Despite reports of the build-up of German forces and even knowing the date of the Germans attack, Gamelin did nothing, stating that he would "await events". When the Germans attacked, Gamelin insisted on moving 40 of his best divisions, including the British Expeditionary Force, northwards to conform to the Dyle Plan. The French mobilisation had called up many essential workers, and this disrupted vital French industries in the first weeks of the campaign.

In the first few days of the campaign, much of the air force was attacked on the ground. The rest of the air support was concentrated on the French advance rather than attacking the exposed 150 km (93 mi) column supplying the German advance. Quickly, the French and the British became fearful of being outflanked and they withdrew from the defensive lines drawn up across Belgium. They did not pull back fast enough to prevent them being outflanked by the German Panzer divisions.

The German wing that attacked further south was able to cross the River Meuse faster than anticipated, aided by heavy Luftwaffe aerial bombardment. Although almost all the crossings over the Meuse were destroyed by the French, one weir 60 km (37 mi) north of Sedan had been left intact and was only lightly defended. It was thus quickly captured and exploited by the Germans. Meanwhile, French guns were ordered to limit their firing in case they ran out of ammunition. On this front, Colonel-General Heinz Guderian disobeyed orders and forged ahead. Gamelin withdrew forces in this area so that they could defend Paris, thinking this was the German's objective, rather than the coast.

Believing that he had been betrayed rather than blaming his own tactics, Gamelin then sacked twenty of his front line commanders.

Further north, Major-General Erwin Rommel also kept advancing quickly, against orders. He reached the sea to the west of the British Expeditionary Force, trapping the forces that had been sent into the Low Countries around Arras and Dunkirk. In moving from France to Belgium and then back to France, a substantial amount of the armour was lost due to mechanical failure. The French and British could no longer launch a counterattack spearheaded by tanks and thus break out of encirclement. The speed of this advance, German air supremacy, the inability of the British and French to successfully counter-attack, and suspicions of complicity undermined the overall Allied position to such a degree that Britain abandoned the conflict on the continent. 338,226 men (including 120,000 French soldiers) withdrew across the English Channel during the Dunkirk evacuation. A second British Expeditionary Force, due to land in Normandy in mid-June, was cancelled.

The Dutch surrendered within five days of being attacked, the Belgians in a little over two weeks, and the French were left with only a rump of their former army to defend their nation. Gamelin was removed from his post on 18 May 1940 by Paul Reynaud, who had replaced Édouard Daladier as Prime Minister in March. The 68 year-old Gamelin was replaced by the 73 year-old Maxime Weygand, who crucially delayed planned counter-attacks prior to eventually launching them.