Immigration and Naturalization Service V. Aguirre-Aguirre - Decision of The Court

Decision of The Court

The U.S. Attorney General must grant an applicant withholding of removal if he determines that the alien's life or freedom would be threatened in a country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1). Generally, withholding of deportation is required if it is more likely than not that the alien would be persecuted in his home country on account of one of the protected grounds. However, withholding does not apply if the Attorney General determines that "there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical offense outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C).

The Ninth Circuit did not disagree that the "serious political offense" exception to mandatory withholding was the proper framework under which to analyze the case. But the Ninth Circuit missed a step when it proceeded to analyze the BIA's legal conclusion. The Ninth Circuit had "confronted questions implicating" the BIA's "construction of the statute which it administers," and this meant that it should have asked whether "the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue" before it. If so, then the Ninth Circuit should have asked whether the BIA's construction of the statute was a permissible one. The Court clarified that this threshold inquiry, called Chevron deference, applies to questions of the BIA's interpretations of parts of the Immigration and Nationality Act, including the "serious political offense" exception.

The BIA had already determined that the alien's criminal acts were not to be judged against the risk that he will be persecuted if he returned to his home country. This conclusion was consistent with the text of the statute, as it "is not obvious that an already-completed crime is somehow rendered less serious by considering the future circumstance that the alien may be subject to persecution if returned to his home country." In essence, the BIA concluded that Aguirre was not eligible for withholding of deportation even assuming he could establish a threat of persecution. Because this conclusion was consistent with the statute, the Ninth Circuit overstepped its bounds by disturbing it.

The Ninth Circuit had said that the "political nature of the offenses would be more difficult to accept if they involved acts of an atrocious nature," such as indiscriminate massacre of civilians. But the BIA did not dispute that this, in the abstract, "may be important in applying the serious nonpolitical crime exception." The BIA simply was not persuaded in this case to discount the nonpolitical nature of Aguirre's actions. An act need not be atrocious to be nonpolitical, and the statute recognizes this. The Ninth Circuit was wrong to force this kind of equivalence on the BIA.