Fireproofing - Fraud

Fraud

The following examples of fraud are preventable when documentation is required and checked to ensure that all installed configurations fall within the tolerances of active certification listings.

• Entraining too much air in inorganic systems, thus reducing densities, saves on materials and labour.
• Spraying inorganic spray fireproofing materials over through-penetrations and building joints that should be firestopped, not fireproofed. This practice negates fire-separation integrity. Firestops must precede spray fireproofing.
  
• Substitution of intumescent and/or endothermic fireproofing coatings with less expensive paints that physically resemble the passive fire protection products, sometimes involving re-use of packaging and de-canting of contents.
• The American and Canadian nuclear industries have, historically, not insisted on listing and approval use and compliance, on the basis of the use of accredited certification laboratories. This has allowed the use of Thermo-Lag 330-1, for which the basis of testing has been proven to be faulty, resulting in millions of dollars of remedial work. The Thermo-Lag scandal came to light as a result of disclosures by American whistleblower Gerald W. Brown, who reported the deficiencies in fire testing to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Presently, product certification of fireproofing and firestopping remains optional for systems installed in nuclear power plants both in Canada and the United States.