Theory and Methods
One of the most perplexing problems for those new to ethnomethodology is the discovery that it lacks both a formally stated theory and a formal methodology. As serious as these problems might appear on the face of it, neither has prevented ethnomethodologists from doing ethnomethodological studies, and generating a substantial literature of "findings".
John Heritage has noted the, "off-stage role of theory", in ethnomethodological writings, and the concern that there is nowhere in the ethnomethodological corpus a systematic theoretical statement that would serve as a touchstone for ethnomethodological inquiries.
Instead, as in the case of, Studies in Ethnomethodology (1967), we are given oblique theoretical references to: Wittgenstein ; Husserl ; Gurwitsch ; the works of the social phenomenologist Alfred Schutz ; and an assortment of traditional social theorists generally appearing as antipodes and/or sounding boards for ethnomethodological ideas.
Likewise in, Ethnomethodology's Program (2002), we again find a multiplicity of theoretical references, including the usual suspects from Studies, and introducing among others, a key theoretical statement by Emile Durkheim regarding the objectivity of social facts, and a key insight into ethomethodology's way of doing theory.
This statement by Durkheim, although not a fully worked out theory or directive in its original form, or conceived as an aphorism for that matter, becomes, in the hands of Garfinkel, a theoretical directive - an "aphorism" - regarding both the object of ethnomethodological studies, and the focus of ethnomethodological description. For this interpretation, Garfinkel "appropriates" Durkheim's statement, "misreads" it ethnomethodologically (2002:112:fn#36 / see below:"Some leading policies...": "Misreading "), and transforms its meaning through its "respecification" into an ethnomethodologically useful directive for ethnomethodological studies.
Durkheim's statement: "...our basic principle, that of the objective reality of social facts. It is...upon this principle that in the end everything rests, and everything comes back to it" (Durkheim:1895:45 - as cited from Rawls/Garfinkel:2002:2:fn#2).
Rawls/Garfinkel's characterization: "Durkheim's aphorism refers to Durkheim's statement in, The Rules of Sociological Method, to the effect that, 'The objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental principle'" (2002:9,119).
"Misreading" Durkheim's statement in the context of, as juxtaposed to, or read against, the fundamental assumption of ethnomethodological studies, produces an ethnomethodological "respecification" of Durkheim's statement .
Garfinkel writes: "Ethnomethodology's fundamental phenomenon and it's standing technical preoccupation in its studies is to find, collect, specify, and make instructably observable the local endogenous production and natural accountability of immortal familiar society's most ordinary organizational things in the world, and to provide for them both and simultaneously, as objects, and procedurally, as alternate methods" (Garfinkel:2002:124).
"Durkheim's aphorism", now ethnomethodologically respecified, directs us to account for this, "objective reality of social facts" (Durkheim), these, "organizational things in the world" (Garfinkel), as, social "objects", and their, in situ "methods" of production; that is, in terms of their factual status as, "organizational things in the world", and simultaneously, as methodic achievements by real individuals in actual social settings.
This, in a nutshell, becomes the central tenet of ethnomethodology's research program: "working out Durkheim's aphorism" (2002:118-119:fn#46). Rawls states: "According to Garfinkel, the result of Ethnomethodological studies is the fulfillment of Durkheim's promise that the objective reality of social facts is sociology's fundamental principle" (Rawls/Garfinkel:2002:9). As such, ethnomethodology's programmatic directive becomes,"...to restore Sociology to the pursuit of Durkheim's aphorism, through an insistence on the concreteness of things, and on the claim that the concreteness of things necessarily depends on, and is produced in and through, complex mutually recognizable practices enacted by participants in social scenes" (Rawls/Garfinkel:2002:2).
Such a reading serves to locate ethnomethodology firmly in the sociological tradition, if not de facto serving to appropriate that tradition, and serves as an example of ethnomethodological theorizing, but it does not in itself, or combined with any or all of the other references, constitute a unified theoretical statement in any traditional sense.
The larger point here is that the authors and theoretical references cited in Garfinkel's work do not themselves serve as a rigorous theoretical underpinning for ethnomethodology, in whole or in part. Ethnomethodology is not Durkheimian, although it shares some of the interests of Durkheim; it is not a form of phenomenology, although it borrows from Husserl and Schutz's studies of the Lifeworld ; it is not a form of Gestalt theory, although it describes social orders as having Gestalt-like properties; and, it is not a version of Wittgenstein's Ordinary Language Analysis, although it makes use of Wittgenstein's understanding of rule-use, etc.
Instead, these borrowings are only fragmentary references to theoretical works from which ethnomethodology has "appropriated", "misread", and/or, "respecified", the theoretical ideas of others for the expressed purposes of doing ethnomethodological investigations.
In terms of the question of ethnomethodological methods, it is the position of Anne Rawls, speaking for Garfinkel, that ethnomethodology is itself not a method. That is, it does not have a set of formal research methods or procedures. Instead, the position taken is that ethnomethodologists have conducted their studies in a variety of ways, and that the point of these investigations is, " ...to discover the things that persons in particular situations do, the methods they use, to create the patterned orderliness of social life".
As Rawls states: "Ethnomethodology...is not a methodology, but rather a study of methodology" (Rawls/Garfinkel:2002:122:fn.#3). That is, it does not have a formal methodology, but is the study of, "member's methods", the methods of others (Garfinkel:2002:72-73). Michael Lynch has also noted that: "Leading figures in the field have repeatedly emphasized that there is no obligatory set of methods, and no prohibition against using any research procedure whatsoever, if it is adequate to the particular phenomena under study" (Lynch:1989; see Garfinkel:2002:175-176, Wieder/Garfinkel:1992:175-206).
Again, as perplexing as this position might seem to a traditional social scientist, such a proposition is consistent with ethnomethodology's understanding of "member's methods", and has philosophical standing when looked at in terms of certain lines of philosophical thought regarding the philosophy of science (Polyani:1974; Kuhn:1996; Feyerabend:1975/2010), and the study of the actual practices of scientific procedure (Lynch:1993).
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