Mental State (Mens Rea)
Mens rea refers to the crime's mental elements of the defendant's intent. This is a necessary element—that is, the criminal act must be voluntary or purposeful. Mens rea is the mental intention (mental fault), or the defendant's state of mind at the time of the offense, sometimes called the guilty mind. It stems from the ancient maxim of obscure origin, "actus reus non facit reum nisi mens sit reas" that is translated as "the act is not guilty unless the mind is guilty." For example, the mens rea of aggravated battery is the intention to do serious bodily harm. Mens rea is almost always a necessary component in order to prove that a criminal act has been committed.
Mens rea varies depending on the offense. For murder, the mental element requires the defendant acted with "malice aforethought". Others may require proof the act was committed with such mental elements such as "knowingly" or "willfulness" or "recklessness". Arson requires an intent to commit a forbidden act, while others such as murder require an intent to produce a forbidden result. Motive, the reason the act was committed, is not the same as mens rea and the law is not concerned with motive.
Although most legal systems recognize the importance of the guilty mind, or mens rea, exactly what is meant by this concept varies. The American Law Institute's Model Penal Code has reduced the mental states to four. In general, guilt can be attributed to an individual who acts "purposely," "knowingly," "recklessly," or "negligently." Together or in combination, these four attributes seem basically effective in dealing with most of the common mens rea issues.
Read more about this topic: Element (criminal Law)
Famous quotes containing the words mental and/or state:
“Dont be afraid of me because Im just coming back home from
the mental hospitalIm your mother”
—Allen Ginsberg (b. 1926)
“To place liberty in an indifferency, antecedent to the thought and judgment of the understanding, seems to me to place liberty in a state of darkness, wherein we can neither see nor say any thing of it.”
—John Locke (16321704)