Arguments
Since there is evidence that positive illusions may be more common in normally mentally healthy individuals than in depressed individuals, Taylor and Brown (1988) argue that they are adaptive.
However, Pacini, Muir and Epstein (1998) point out that from the perspective of Cognitive-Experiential Self-Theory, depressive realism may be because depressed people overcompensate for a tendency toward maladaptive intuitive processing by exercising excessive rational control in trivial situations, and note that the difference with non-depressed people disappears in more consequential circumstances.
Knee and Zuckerman (1998) have challenged the definition of mental health used by Taylor and Brown and argue that lack of illusions is associated with a non-defensive personality oriented towards growth and learning and with low ego involvement in outcomes. They present evidence that self-determined individuals are less prone to these illusions.
Colvin and Block (1995) have criticised the logic and empirical evidence used by Taylor and Brown to link mental health and positive illusions. They argue that there are a fair number of studies that fail to replicate the findings, and that a closer examination of the evidence doesn't support their thesis.
Dykman et al. (1989) argue that, although depressive people make more accurate judgments about having no control in situations where in fact they have no control, they also believe they have no control when in fact they do; and so their perceptions are not more accurate overall.
Dunning and Story (1991) have shown that when applied to real world settings, depressed individuals are less accurate in their predictions about the future and more overconfident than their nondepressed counterparts.
Read more about this topic: Depressive Realism
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