Description
The foliage is a dull dark to light green color, with scale-like leaves 1-1.5 mm long, with the leaf tips not spreading; seedlings bear needle-like leaves 8-10 mm long. The cones are small, 11-24 mm long, and almost spherical, with six or eight scales arranged in opposite decussate pairs, with the bract visible as no more than a small lump or short spine on the scale. The seeds are 3-5 mm long, with a pair of small wings along the sides. The cones remain closed on the trees for many years, until the trees are killed by a forest fire; after the tree is dead, the cones open to release the seeds which can then germinate successfully on the bare fire-cleared ground.
The Mendocino Cypress differs little from C. goveniana in morphology, with the most conspicuous difference in herbarium material being the usually glossy black seeds, unlike the dull brown seeds of C. goveniana, but even this character is not constant, with dull brown seeds found in the southernmost populations of C. pygmaea near Point Arena. Preliminary genetic studies have shown some differences, with notably some plastid sequences (matK, rbcL, and trnL) suggesting a possible closer relationship to C. macrocarpa, though other sequences confirm its close relationship to C. goveniana. In cultivation together with C. goveniana, it retains a very different crown shape, with a tall slender crown, contrasting with the broad, shrubby crown of C. goveniana; it also has darker green foliage (paler, yellow-green in C. goveniana).
The largest recorded specimen is located in Mendocino County, with recorded dimensions of 43 m height, 2.13 m diameter, and 12 m crown spread, in 2000.
Read more about this topic: Cupressus Pigmaea
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