Bronston V. United States - Decision

Decision

The Court heard arguments on November 15, 1972. Sheldon Elsen argued for Brontson, with Andrew Frey taking the federal government's side.

Less than two months later, the Court issued its brief ruling, unanimously siding with the appellant. While he conceded that Bronston's answer may have been intended to mislead, Burger felt it would be going far beyond Congress's intent to apply the statute that broadly. He considered Brontson's answer to be a "testimonial mishap that could readily have been reached with a single additional question by counsel alert — as every examiner ought to be — to the incongruity of petitioner's unresponsive answer", a point he reiterates several times throughout the opinion. Such an application also conflicted with the literal wording of the law, which defined perjury as willfully stating under oath any material matter which the witness does not believe to be true.

A casual listener might have believed from Bronston's answer that he himself had never had any Swiss bank accounts, he agreed. "But we are not dealing with casual conversation and the statute does not make it a criminal act for a witness to willfully state any material matter that implies any material matter that he does not believe to be true" since intent to mislead or evade might not be the underlying reason: "Under the pressures and tensions of interrogation, it is not uncommon for the most earnest witnesses to give answers that are not entirely responsive. Sometimes the witness does not understand the question, or may in an excess of caution or apprehension read too much or too little into it."

Witnesses, he understood, might also be reluctant to discuss personally embarrassing matters, particularly in a bankruptcy proceeding. "If a witness evades, it is the lawyer's responsibility to recognize the evasion and to bring the witness back to the mark, to flush out the whole truth with the tools of adversary examination." The trial jury's finding that Bronston had intended to mislead was of no consequence, and indeed should not have been a determination they were allowed to make:

A jury should not be permitted to engage in conjecture whether an unresponsive answer, true and complete on its face, was intended to mislead or divert the examiner; the state of mind of the witness is relevant only to the extent that it bears on whether "he does not believe to be true." To hold otherwise would be to inject a new and confusing element into the adversary testimonial system we know. Witnesses would be unsure of the extent of their responsibility for the misunderstandings and inadequacies of examiners, and might well fear having that responsibility tested by a jury under the vague rubric of "intent to mislead" or "perjury by implication."

He reviewed the history of perjury, and recalled that when it first started being prosecuted, authorities realized it had to be narrowly construed, otherwise people would be deterred from testfying over fears of being prosecuted themselves. Existing case law supported that position as well.

"Precise questioning is imperative as a predicate for the offense of perjury", he said, one last time, a sentence frequently quoted since then.