Big Week - Background

Background

Prior to the Big Week, throughout 1943, the U.S. 8th Air Force had been growing in size and experience, and started pressing attacks deeper into Germany. It was believed that the defensive firepower of the B-17 and B-24 bombers, typically ten .50 caliber machine guns or more, would allow them to defend themselves as long as they remained arranged into tight formations, allowing for overlapping fire. In practice this proved less successful; although the bombers did claim a fair number of German fighters, losses among the bombers were unsustainable.

The Schweinfurt-Regensburg missions are a famous example. On August 17, 1943, 230 bombers launched a mission against the ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt and another 146 against the aircraft factories in Regensburg. Of this force, 60 aircraft were lost before returning to base, and another 87 had to be scrapped due to irreparable damage. The Germans claimed 27 fighters lost, serious enough, but paling in comparison to the losses on the part of the US forces. A second raid on October 14, 1943, infamously remembered as "Black Thursday" fared almost as poorly; of the 291 aircraft on the mission, 77 were lost. Daylight missions into Germany were called off in order to rebuild the forces.

The raids were extensively studied by both forces. The Germans concluded that their current strategy of deploying twin-engine designs with heavy armament was working well. Over the winter of 1943/44 they continued this program, adding to their heavy fighter ranks and developing heavier armaments for all of their aircraft. They also pulled almost all of their fighter forces back into Germany, as the majority of their losses were due to fighter actions over forward areas. There seemed to be no point to try attacking the bombers with enemy fighters in the area. The Allied forces came to other conclusions. Schweinfurt demonstrated that the bombers were not able to protect themselves, contrary to earlier thinking, and fighter cover had to be extended over the entire mission. Luckily for the U.S., the P-51 Mustang was just starting to arrive in quantity, an aircraft that had the range to escort the bombers to targets deep within Germany. Over the winter they re-organized their fighter squadrons as Mustangs arrived and longer-range versions of their existing aircraft were developed.

By the time the winter weather started to clear in early 1944, both forces had implemented their plans and were waiting to put them into action. The U.S., expecting a fighter advantage, planned missions that would demand a German response. They decided to make massive raids on the German fighter factories; if the Germans chose not to respond they would be at risk of losing the air war without firing a shot, if they did respond, they would meet fighters in the process. But the Germans needed no provocation, they were ready to meet any future raid with their newly prepared forces. But by up-gunning their fighters they reduced their performance, making them easy targets for the new and unexpected Mustangs.