Battle of Mount Tabor (1799)

The Battle of Mount Tabor, or Skirmish of Mount Tabor, opposed French forces under General Kleber to an Ottoman force led by the Pasha of Damascus on 16 April 1799. General Bonaparte was besieging Acre, and Damascus sent its army to relieve the siege. Operating to the south of Acre, Israel.

After the successes of other elements of Napoleon’s army, Kléber decided to surprise the main Ottoman concentration of about 35,000 men (25,000 cavalry – many of them Mamelukes, 10,000 infantry and the Pasha – much of the Ottoman army being a poorly trained rabble of volunteers and militia), which he had come across camped below Mount Tabor in the Plain of Esdraelon - South of Murat, with just a division of approximately 2,000 in a daring night raid which he hoped would hold him in good stead with Napoleon. He must have believed the he had at least a few chances of victory, with his peers and himself being outnumbered and winning previous battles where the enemy knew of their presence. He decided upon a night attack, on the 15th April, where he would march round Mount Tabor from the North and destroy the Ottoman Camp. Kléber sent dispatches to Napoleon about the forthcoming action which would reach him around the time of the battle but not give him a chance to intervene with its outset. Napoleon having been handed the dispatches decided to support and reinforce Kléber with a few thousand men that were based around Acre, but no where near enough, even with the 2,000 under Kléber, to beat the Pasha’s main army in a set piece battle. Kléber marched from Nazareth East round Mount Tabor and West of the River Jourdan.

Unfortunately for Kléber his march time was badly estimated and at the break of dawn (at around six o’clock) he was at the base on the Southern side of Mount Tabor. With Kléber’s headquarters was General Verdier’s wife, Verdier commanding a brigade during the forthcoming battle. The body of troops was soon spotted by the Ottoman’s and Kléber realised that his best bet was to form square (in this case two squares were formed) to preserve as many men a possible; it would have been difficult for him to make a quick dash to any prominent position but in hindsight he could have moved much closer to the river which could have helped his logistical position (with nearby/closer water) and tactical position (with the Ottomans struggling to attack through/from the water); even though he probably would have not been able to make it even within musket range of the waters edge before he came under contact. Another option would have been to attempt to climb as much of Mount Tabor as would be possible in his limited amount of time.

So the fighting began and for ten hours from 6am-4pm the French stood against repeated Ottoman charges, their casualties were few and their square remained but the ammunition stocks were low and the men were full of thirst and hunger. The Frenchmen had very little time in which they could eat and when they could the soldiers were not able to take advantage of it for they could hardly speak through fatigue and thirst, although many of them would happily of replaced the little food which they possessed with musket balls and gunpowder. Don’t be mistaken, the Ottomans suffered substantial losses but they could easily replace their casualties and keep up, with good supplies and strength, repeated strikes throughout the day.

Just when all seemed to be lost, and Kléber was preparing to make a last ditch breakout towards the river to the East, a few soldiers saw a brief glimpse of a military force advancing upon them from the North. Kléber moved to indulge himself in the view of a new force which could easily be a relief column under Napoleon, but he saw nothing but the open desert and a monstrous enemy force. What had actually happened was that the relief column under the personal command of Napoleon Bonaparte was only momentarily in the view of the square until it had marched right into a dip, just when Kléber was looking. Soon, though, Kléber saw the relief column and the men began to feel that their general was going to save their lives which just a few minutes earlier had seemed in doubt. They should not have been confident though because man for man the French were better than the Ottomans but they still had many times more men than Napoleon and Kléber could ever gather. Napoleon made an attempt at dislodging the confidence of the Ottomans, when he eventually arrived, by detaching 300 men to pillage and destroy the Ottoman camp; for Napoleon was advancing into the divide between the Ottomans and their camp. This had consequences that Napoleon could never have imagined as he advanced upon the Ottoman forces. The Turks, seeing the destruction of their belongings, themselves felt surrounded and a small retreat, to the South and across the River Jourdan, from a few turned into a general rout and they were pursued by Kléber – who had ordered his men to charge in a last effort for the day – and Napoleon – who’s men were relatively fresh - being cut to pieces by the victorious Frenchmen who had suffered from such serious fatigue over the preceding hours. Kléber’s men had their thirst had been replaced by an adrenaline flow for the river to run red with blood, many Turks were cut killed in the rout. Overall Kléber’s casualties were two dead and seventeen wounded but if Napoleon had arrived just an hour later they could have been so many more. While the Ottomans, although estimates can not be relied upon, had lost a large proportion of their overall force, especially when compared to French casualties. This victory ended any major threat of the Pasha’s Army disrupting the Siege of Acre. In fact the surviving Ottomans were scattered and the army was not totally destroyed but there was little need for Napoleon to worry for a long time.