Battle of Albert (1916) - Consequences For The German Army

Consequences For The German Army

A direct result of the Battle of Albert was that the German Chief of the General Staff Erich von Falkenhayn dismissed Second Army's chief of staff Major General Grünert, who he blamed for the French successes during this battle, and replaced him with his own operations officer, the defensive specialist Colonel Fritz von Lossberg on 2 July. Von Lossberg began changing German defensive doctrine from one of holding the front line in force, as previously ordered by Second Army's commander Fritz von Below and von Falkenhayn, to a new doctrine of flexible defense in depth to minimise casualties, with reserves held further back in relative safety available to recover lost ground by counter-attacks.

On 12 July von Falkenhayn called off his attack on the French at Verdun. This may be viewed as a strategic consequence of pressure exerted on German defenders during the Battle of Albert and the need to send reinforcements. However, the German attack on Fort Souville on 11 July had already failed and the Battle of Verdun had by then degenerated into a costly stalemate and the Russian Brusilov Offensive on the Eastern front was placing new demands on German forces.

While the Battle of Albert can be viewed as a German tactical victory over the British, and at worst a stalemate, at the strategic level the situation was viewed as worrying. The growing British artillery strength, backed by the increasingly large supplies of guns and ammunition from the United States, demonstrated that in future the British would hold artillery superiority, especially as Britain could be expected to improve its usage of this advantage. This battle also demonstrated the first coordinated offensives by the Allies, compared with the piecemeal offensives to date :

"...for the first time since the commencement of the war, unity of action on the fronts of the Quadruple Alliance has become a fact, on which our enemies can congratulate themselves. We have got to face a Russian, an Italian and a Franco-English offensive at the same time..." Kölnische Volkszeitung, 4 July.

A German intelligence report of 4 July concluded :

"...we can be pretty sure that they will continue to pursue their aim by new attacks, perhaps backed up by even more artillery and ammunition... the British have invested too many hopes in the success of this attack for them to be deflected from their course by an initial failure".

Germany was forced to abandon an intended attack by Sixth Army further north, instead diverting its divisions to the Somme front - 14 by 9 July. Haig's apparent willingness to commit the British army to a war of attrition alarmed German leaders as it was recognised that Germany lacked the manpower and reserves itself to fight a war of attrition.

General von Below was effectively demoted to command First Army north of the Somme river, with General Max von Gallwitz in command both of the overall Somme front, and of Second Army which was now responsible for the zone south of the Somme river. In addition, the Germans divided their army corps on the Somme into Gruppen named after their commanders to achieve better control of the now enlarged troop numbers. Divisions could be transferred between Gruppen but each Grup had its set area of responsibility : Gruppe Stein (XIV Reserve Corps) in the north, Gruppe Sixt von Armin (IV Corps) in the centre and Gruppe Gossler (VI Reserve Corps) in the south. This arrangement was scheduled to be implemented early on 14 July, unfortunately for the Germans at precisely the same moment when the British launched the next phase of their offensive, the Battle of Bazentin Ridge.