Austrian Communists - Weaknesses and Crises

Weaknesses and Crises

During the 10-year allied occupation from 1945–55, the threat of national division similar to that which befell post-war Germany loomed large. The Iron Curtain was dividing the European continent into two halves. Previously kept top-secret documents in the archives in Moscow have recently been made available to the public. The so-called Sondermappe contains valuable information about loans given to the provisional Austrian government of Renner, as well as about the extent of Soviet support and influence on the KPÖ and events in Austria. In December 2005, the Austrian Academy of Sciences (Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften) published a new report, as a finale to the jubilee year of 50 years of Austrian independence since World War II. The report, which has been summarised in the book Sowjetische Politik in Österreich 1945-1955 by the historian Werner Mueller, reveals that the leadership of the KPÖ was in constant contact with the Soviet authorities and Moscow. The ÖVP and the SPÖ were able to win the majority of the votes in parliamentary elections on November 25, 1945 (St. Catherine's Day, therefore the elections became known as the Katharinen-Wahl), the KPÖ surprisingly won only four mandates. The KPÖ representative in Moscow, Friedrich Hexmann (b. 1900 – d. 1991) had to present a report to the Politburo with proposals on how to improve the situation for the party. The problem with the strategy of the communists was their goal to build a future coalition (Volksfront) with the socialists. This however meant that the difference between the KPÖ and the SPÖ was not very apparent, which meant severe losses to the communists. There were also several other problems back then with the party’s ideology:

• 1) The party projected itself as a true Austrian patriotic party, believing and having fought for the liberation from Nazi Germany. The KPÖ had little problem correctly identifying and admitting the guilt that Austrians had in the crimes committed under the Hitler regime. Insofar, the KPÖ was already ahead of its time. However, right after the war Austria preferred to have a collective amnesia about its role and preferred to regard itself as the first victim of Nazi Germany, not its supporter. Any talk by the communists of the guilt that Austrians carried was therefore not working in favour for the KPÖ.

• 2) The KPÖ advocated full compensation of war damages to the Soviet Union and

• 3) It supported further closer ties to Moscow, not necessarily to the West.

Retrospectively, it can be assumed that especially the closeness of the KPÖ to Moscow made many voters wary of the party and its aims. In the former territories of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, multiparty democracies were slowly but surely being penetrated and undermined by the local communist parties with the covert or even overt support of the Soviets, as was observable in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland. As the Iron Curtain was being drawn closed, Austrians feared the same fate as their neighbours.

Talks between the leader Johann Koplenig and Stalin (Sondermappe Codename: Gen. Filipof(f)) resulted in proposals of a possible division of Austria between East and West, similar to Germany. Since the KPÖ was constantly losing votes in the parliamentary elections, a division and establishment of a communist-led East Austria would have been a practical way to consolidate at least a part of their dwindling power. Interestingly, the Soviet authorities in Moscow showed little interest for such a division for various reasons: the size of a newly established East Austria would have been quite small and may not have been capable of existing without massive assistance. Already, the situation in the Soviet sector of Austria was extremely difficult as the Soviets confiscated all industries, factories and goods and transported anything of economic value back to the Soviet Union as part of war-reparations. Strategically, a division of Austria would have ultimately meant that a West Austria, closely linked to NATO, would have provided a connection between West Germany and Italy. A united, neutral Austria however could act as a barrier, together with Switzerland, thereby securing a part of the Central European front for the Soviets. The proposals by the Austrian communists were therefore brushed aside.

Historians agree that Austria was extremely lucky considering the circumstances. Why was Austria spared the fate of a complete communist dictatorship unlike its neighbouring countries or even state division as in Germany? The position of the communists in Austria was not strong enough in order for them to effectively take over power, as opposed to in Czechoslovakia for example. The potentially important working class preferred to vote for the SPÖ; not even the great strike of 1950 could change that pattern. Besides, even though Austria and Vienna was divided up into four zones controlled by the Allies, similar to Germany and Berlin, an "East Austria" would have been unviable. Stalin was basically not willing to waste any further time and energy for this seemingly difficult situation, focusing rather on consolidation of the rest of eastern and central Europe under Moscow’s rule. The only realistic exit strategy was to come to some favourable agreement with the Americans, British, and French and restore Austria’s independence.

Moscow wanted a guarantee of neutrality as a pre-condition for the release of Austria into independence; the country would not be allowed to join either sides of the Iron Curtain. As negotiations got underway, the KPÖ changed its tactics. The KPÖ swerved to Moscow’s stance and supported the idea of neutrality during the negotiations of the Austrian State Treaty. Many members of the other parties, such as Leopold Figl, did not want neutrality but a firm anchoring with the West and NATO. However the Soviets were able to push this demand through. The Austrian State Treaty was voted upon on May 15, 1955, the declaration of neutrality proclaimed on October 26, 1955. This was decided in the National Council with the votes of the ÖVP, SPÖ and the KPÖ; the Federation of Independents (VdU, the forerunner of the FPÖ) voted against neutrality.

Because of the economic recovery and the end of the occupation in 1955, the protective power of the Soviet occupiers was lost to the KPÖ. The party lost a main pillar of support and was shaken by internal crisis. Just like most of the other communist parties around the world, the KPÖ had oriented itself towards Marxism-Leninism of the Stalinist brand. After Stalin’s death, Nikita Khrushchev took over as chairman of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He pursued a course of reform and shocked delegates at the 20th Party Congress on February 23, 1956 by making his famous Secret Speech denouncing the "cult of personality" that surrounded Stalin. As a consequence of this "thaw" the KPÖ also dissociated itself from Stalinism. A thorough analysis of the causes and the erroneous interpretations connected with Stalinism as well as its negative impact on socialism and the communist world movement, however, took place only after the collapse of the communist bloc in 1989.

The party’s failure to condemn the bloody suppression of the 1956 Hungarian uprising led to a wave of withdrawals from the party. On May 10, 1959 the KPÖ lost the National Council elections, receiving 142,000 votes, 3.3% of the total tally and thus missing the 4% benchmark.

The invasion of Czechoslovakia by Soviet troops in 1968 during the Prague Spring was at first condemned by the KPÖ. However in 1971 the party revised its position and swung back to the Soviet side. A critic of these developments ("tank communism"), the former KPÖ Minister of Education, Ernst Fischer was expelled from the party and rehabilitated in only 1998.

Because of the continuiing fall in support, in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the party flirted briefly with the idea of Eurocommunism. This was a new brand of communism, tailored specifically to western European needs, away from the diktat of Moscow and the eastern European communist parties. Eurocommunism was supposed to work within the framework of a liberal democracy without abandoning the aims of communism. This in turn provoked the protest of the core supporter, who saw little difference to socialism and feared a weakening of the communist cause. The leadership of the KPÖ eventually saw itself forced to backtrack on this new ideology and Eurocommunism was subsequently dropped, the party restoring the connections to the CPSU.

Having previously had 150,000 members in the first couple of post-war years, the party’s ranks shrank to around 35,000 in the 1960s and to a few thousands in the 1970s. As of 2005, membership stands at about 3,500 members.

The KPÖ was represented in the National Council from 1945 until 1959, in the state assemblies (Landtage) (partially with interruptions) of Salzburg until 1949, in Lower Austria until 1954, in the Burgenland until 1956, in Vienna until 1969 and in Carinthia as well as Styria until 1970. In Upper Austria, the Tyrol and Vorarlberg the KPÖ never won state representation. After losing its seats in the National Council and the state assemblies, the political emphasis shifted inevitably more strongly to enterprises and trade unions, the municipalities and starting from the 1970s to non-parliamentary alliance networks.