Social Intuitionism - Reasons To Doubt The Role of Cognition

Reasons To Doubt The Role of Cognition

Haidt (2001) lists four reasons to doubt the cognitive primacy model championed by Kohlberg and others.

  1. There is considerable evidence that many evaluations, including moral judgments, take place automatically, at least in their initial stages (and these initial judgments anchor subsequent judgments).
  2. The moral reasoning process is highly biased by two sets of motives, which Haidt labels "relatedness" motives (relating to managing impressions and having smooth interactions with others) and "coherence" motives (preserving a coherent identity and worldview).
  3. The reasoning process has repeatedly been shown to create convincing post hoc justifications for behavior that are believed by people despite not actually correctly describing the reason underlying the choice. This was demonstrated in a classic paper by Nisbett and Wilson (1977).
  4. According to Haidt, moral action covaries more with moral emotion than with moral reasoning.

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