Social Intuitionism

In moral psychology, social intuitionism proposes that moral judgments and actions are caused more by emotions than by reason. It contradicts earlier, rationalist theories of morality, such as of Lawrence Kohlberg's stage theory of moral reasoning. Jonathan Haidt (2001) greatly de-emphasizes the role of reasoning in reaching moral conclusions. Haidt asserts that moral judgment is primarily given rise to by intuition with reasoning playing a very marginalized role in most of our moral decision-making. Conscious thought-processes serves as a kind of post hoc justification of our decisions.

His main evidence comes from studies of "moral dumbfounding" where people have strong moral reactions but fail to establish any kind of rational principle to explain their reaction. An example situation in which moral intuitions are activated is as follows: Imagine that a brother and sister sleep together once. No one else knows, no harm befalls either one, and both feel it brought them closer as siblings. Most people imagining this incest scenario have very strong negative reaction, yet cannot explain why. Haidt suggests that we have affective heuristics which are unconscious that generate our reactions to morally charged situations and our moral behavior. He suggests that if people reason about morality, it is independent of processes causing moral decisions to be made.

Haidt's model also states that moral reasoning is more likely to be interpersonal than private, reflecting social motives rather than abstract principles. He does grant that interpersonal discussion (and, on very rare occasions, private reflection) can activate new intuitions which will then be carried forward into future judgments.