Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language by philosopher of language Saul Kripke was first published in 1982. The book contends that the central argument of Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations centers on a devastating rule-following paradox that undermines the possibility of us ever following rules in our use of language. Kripke writes that this paradox is "the most radical and original skeptical problem that philosophy has seen to date" (p. 60). He argues that Wittgenstein does not reject the argument that leads to the rule-following paradox, but accepts it and offers a 'skeptical solution' to alleviate the paradox's destructive effects.
While most commentators accept that the Philosophical Investigations contains the rule-following paradox as Kripke presents it, few have concurred in attributing Kripke's skeptical solution to Wittgenstein. Kripke expresses doubts in Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language as to whether Wittgenstein would endorse his interpretation of the Philosophical Investigations. He says that the work should not be read as an attempt to give an accurate statement of Wittgenstein's views, but rather as an account of Wittgenstein's argument "as it struck Kripke, as it presented a problem for him" (p. 5). The portmanteau "Kripkenstein" has been coined as a nickname for Kripke's reading of the Philosophical Investigations. Wittgenstein scholar David G. Stern considers the book to be the most influential and widely discussed work on Wittgenstein since the 1980s.
Read more about Wittgenstein On Rules And Private Language: The Rule-following Paradox, The Skeptical Solution, The "straight" Solution, Controversies Over Kripke's Interpretation
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