Second Patrol
After refitting, she was then assigned to Task Group 7.1. The group of six submarines sailed for Midway Island on 21 May to begin patrolling a 150 miles (240 km) circle in anticipation of the invasion fleet intelligence had reported was en route there. At 07:15 on 4 June, 90 minutes after first reported contact, Admiral Robert H. English, informed his submarines, waiting until after 11:00 to order them to close. Running surfaced, Tambor was strafed by aircraft
At 02:15 on 5 June, Tambor radioed sighting "four large ships" 90 nmi (100 mi; 170 km) north of Midway, at a range of 3 nmi (3.5 mi; 5.6 km). This vague and unhelpful observation was mostly due to Lt.Cdr. John W. Murphy Jr.'s unwillingness to approach close enough to even verify the ships were Japanese (or even warships at all). Lt.Cdr. Murphy's half-hearted effort frustrated Admiral Spruance because without confirmation of the vessels' size, nationality and heading, he could not safely discount the idea that Yamamoto still intended to shell Midway. Thus he was forced to move to block them, thereby denying the Japanese the chance to engage that night (when Spruance's carriers would have been virtually defenseless). Three other ships soon appeared; about forty minutes after Tambor signalled, she was sighted.
Amazingly, the panic this induced in the cruiser force proved to be Tambor's best (and among her only) contribution to the battle. Frantically maneuvering to escape what they believed was an imminent torpedo attack, Mogami and Mikuma collided in the fog, while the other two cruisers (Suzuya and Kumano) fled northwest; Mikuma and Mogami, with the destroyers, limped west at 12 kn (22 km/h; 14 mph). Tambor herself was totally unaware of the chaos she had caused, since she had once again failed to maintain visual contact with the cruiser force and thus did not see the collision or realize she'd been spotted. Not until 04:12 did Tambor finally creep close enough to tentatively identify the ships as Japanese cruisers. Despite having fired no torpedoes thus far in the battle, fearing exposure by daylight, Tambor made no attacks and dove to safety, ignoring even the slow and wounded Mogami, quite literally one of the best targets a submarine could hope for. She played no further role in the battle.
Two days later, Tambor sighted a scout plane 7 mi (6.1 nmi; 11 km) away; she went to 140 feet (43 m). Two depth bombs, which exploded close aboard, damaged both her periscopes and cracked all four battery blower motors, so Tambor returned to Pearl Harbor on 16 June for repairs; Lt.Cdr. Murphy was promptly relieved of duty for timidity in the face of the enemy in light of Tambor's failure to close with and attack the enemy, or at least identify and properly shadow the Japanese cruiser force so aircraft could be vectored to the location (a regular task for both Japanese and American submarines and the primary purpose Tambor was there at all). Lt.Cdr. Murphy's lack of aggressiveness had hampered Spruance's intelligence of the battle and had played the lion's share of the role in allowing Suzuya, Kumano and Mogami to escape almost certain destruction from air attack. Murphy was sent to a shore post, being replaced in command of Tambor by Lt.Cdr. Steven H. Armbruster.
Read more about this topic: USS Tambor (SS-198)