U.S Plan of Campaign For 1815 - History

History

After two years of the war, the Burning of Washington drove Secretary of War John Armstrong, Jr. from office. He was replaced by James Monroe. Monroe and Major General Jacob Brown conferred in Washington from February 6 to February 11, 1815. Both men appeared to have similar ideas, although Monroe had already expressed them when he was temporarily Secretary of War at the end of 1812.

In essence, the plan was to concentrate all the regular units of the U.S. Army in the north, at a point on the Saint Lawrence River, where they would bar the river to British boat traffic. The most probable location for this concentration would be Ogdensburg, to which crude roads ran from Plattsburgh, on Lake Champlain and Sackett's Harbor on Lake Ontario. Had the Americans succeeded in cutting the Saint Lawrence, all British posts west of the Saint Lawrence would ultimately starve and wither. A letter from Monroe to Brown, dated February 10, 1815, which confirmed the instructions to Brown, read in part:

Having had much personal communication with you, relative to the operations of the next campaign, there remains little to be said in this letter, more than to give a general outline of the preparatory measures which it is necessary to adopt, to give effect to the plan which it is intended to pursue.

The great object to be attained, is to carry the war into Canada, and to break the British power there, to the utmost practicable extent. After making due allowance for the number of British forces, for the difficulties attending the passage of the Saint Lawrence, and the immature state of our preparations, I think that we may enter Canada, and gain a decided superiority this next campaign. To what extent it may be carried, is uncertain, as it will depend upon many circumstances, of which we can form no estimate at this time. It seems probable, however, that if we secure the landing of a great force, and beat them completely in the field at any point between Kingston and Montreal, or wherever we may select, we shal be able to drive them into Quebec ...

It is believed that the British commander cannot bring into the field, between the points above mentioned, an army of more than 20,000 regular troops, and 10,000 militia; and that to do this, he must weaken his posts above and below these points. I am satisfied, that this is an high estimate of the British force now there. If we can form an army of 40,000 men, to bear on that district of the country, of which 15,000 are regular troops, and the residue volunteers organized as regular troops, and militia, we must beat their main army.

At every other point above Kingston, our superiority may be whatever we choose to make it; and altho' it will consist principally, or in any considerable force of regular troops, it will be of a character to press the enemy, interrupt his supplies, fight and demolish him...

If we succeed in the invasion of Canada, we take the war from our seaboards at once. It is only by making a defensive war there that we enable the enemy to detach troops here.