United States V. Dion - Reasoning

Reasoning

The Court began by acknowledging that generally Indian tribes enjoy the exclusive rights to hunt and fish on lands granted to them by treaty; such rights, however, could be abrogated by the express terms of Congress. Citing Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock as precedent, the Court concluded that Congress retained the power to modify Indian treaties so long as it does so in clear and explicit terms. Marshall acknowledged that the Court has adopted different standards of review to determine whether Congress intended to abrogate treaty rights. The overriding emphasis, however, is evidence that Congress considered the effect of its actions on existing treaty rights, and chose to resolve the conflict by abrogating the treaty. The Court found that such evidence was strongly suggested on the face of the Eagle Protection Act. The statute allowed for the Secretary of the Interior to grant permits to Indians in some situations; such a framework convincingly showed that Congress was aware of the effect its action would have on Indian hunting rights. The Court also found compelling evidence of congressional intent in the legislative history of the Act. Before hearings on an amendment to extend protection to the golden eagle, Assistant Secretary of the Interior Frank P. Briggs wrote a letter to the subcommittee acknowledging the religious significance of the golden eagle to many Indian tribes of the southwest. The record also revealed that various witnesses gave testimony as to the effects of the ban on Indian tribes. The bill passed with an amendment granting the Secretary the authority to grant case specific permits for Indians to hunt eagles for religious purposes. The Court found adequate evidence in the legislative history that Congress intended to abrogate the treaty rights of Indians.

The Court was unconvinced by the respondent's evidence of an Interior Department memorandum stating that the Eagle Protection Act did not apply to Indian tribes. The Court found no evidence that the memorandum was ever shown to, or contemplated by Congress. The respondent argued further that the permit framework was meant to bind non-Indians from hunting eagles for Indian religious ceremonies, but did not deprive Indian hunters of their exclusive right to hunt eagles on reservations. The Court thought this argument strained credulity.

Finally, Dion asserted a treaty defense to his convictions under the Endangered Species Act. Because the legislative history of that Act revealed almost no discussion of its effect on Indian rights, Dion argued that he was immune from prosecution. The Court disagreed, however, stating that because the Eagle Protection Act divested Dion of his right to hunt eagles, he was barred from asserting that right as a defense in another context such as the Endangered Species Act.