Unconventional Warfare (United States Department of Defense Doctrine) - Evolution of The UW Mission

Evolution of The UW Mission

In 1998, GEN Peter J. Schoomaker, then USSOCOM commander and later Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told Robert E. Kelley "Unconventional warfare is not a viable mission for Special Forces. The only reason you train for unconventional warfare is because it is the best vehicle for maintaining your Special Forces skill set." Kelley also cites the October 1997 Army Special Forces Vision XXI as saying "Dissident elements are the key to UW mission potential in any region. As long as there are dissidents, there will be UW potential to support U.S. national interest."

GEN Schoomaker, however, did use the term global scouts to describe the role that Special Forces have in "preparing the battlefield" before regular forces enter it. While the later stages of UN operations in Somalia suffered from overly ambitious goals resulting in the Battle of Mogadishu, SF teams preceded the United States Marine Corps unit that formed the first overt assistance force, and made contact with various clans whose cooperation was needed. Such contact falls into the early parts of the UW operational model, without moving into combat phases. Other than special reconnaissance, such HUMINT collection is not now listed as a basic SF mission. Kelley suggests that the SF UW doctrine be revised to include just such activity:

• Intelligence activities in a UW environment should be the first area addressed: Schoomaker's global scout role. This can fit into existing UW doctrine if it is understood the resistance may never need to engage in direct combat
• Employment of subversion and sabotage needs to be made a priority, and updated. The update should emphasize that direct access and violent means may not be necessary if, for example, communications and computers can be disrupted by remote information operations
• SF units already have assisted insurgencies as diverse as the Contras and Northern Alliance. A support, rather than leadership, role has not been formulated in SF UW doctrine
• Complete the revision of UW doctrine to take a more modern view of guerrilla warfare, in contrast with the current model that emphasizes World War II-style leadership of rural partisans.

Kelley concluded that UW remains a viable mission, but the doctrine for it, as of 2000, is outdated. It has been relatively rare that U.S. forces, since World War II, actually trained and led a guerrilla force. They did so in Laos, but, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, they supported an existing rebel force. For example, UW missions were sometimes initiated by paramilitary personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency, sometimes with SF personnel on clandestine detail to the CIA. See CIA activities in Laos. Eventually, these UW forces came back under U.S. Army control. Later in the Vietnam War, SF-led units conducted offensive actions against opponents on the Ho Chi Minh Trail and other infiltration paths. Increasingly, SF personnel took on other missions, principally SR and DA.

In 1990-1991, the UW mission supported intelligence collection, sabotage, and subversion by the Kuwaiti underground. UW had a major role, in 2001, of supporting the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. UW experience is more of support to intelligence collection, subversion and sabotage by insurgents, and less one of direct combat through raids and ambushes. Current doctrine allows both; there may need to be a change of emphasis.