Ultimatum Game - Equilibrium Analysis

Equilibrium Analysis

For illustration, we will suppose there is a smallest division of the good available (say 1 cent). Suppose that the total amount of money available is x.

The first player chooses some amount p in the interval . The second player chooses some function f: → {"accept", "reject"} (i.e. the second chooses which divisions to accept and which to reject). We will represent the strategy profile as (p, f), where p is the proposal and f is the function. If f(p) = "accept" the first receives p and the second xp, otherwise both get zero. (p, f) is a Nash equilibrium of the ultimatum game if f(p) = "accept" and there is no y > p such that f(y) = "accept" (i.e. player 2 would reject all proposals in which player 1 receives more than p). The first player would not want to unilaterally increase his/her demand since the second would reject any higher demand. The second would not want to reject the demand, since he/she would then get nothing.

There is one other Nash equilibrium where p = x and f(y) = "reject" for all y>0 (i.e. the second rejects all demands that gives the first any amount at all). Here both players get nothing, but neither could get more by unilaterally changing his/her strategy.

However, only one of these Nash equilibria satisfies a more restrictive equilibrium concept, subgame perfection. Suppose that the first demands a large amount that gives the second some (small) amount of money. By rejecting the demand, the second is choosing nothing rather than something. So, it would be better for the second to choose to accept any demand that gives him/her any amount whatsoever. If the first knows this, he/she will give the second the smallest (non-zero) amount possible.

Read more about this topic:  Ultimatum Game

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