Tanks in The Cold War - The Development of Antitank Weapons and Countermeasures

The Development of Antitank Weapons and Countermeasures

There was also talk that tanks were obsolete and budgets decreased a bit after the Yom Kippur War of 1973 when Israeli tanks were destroyed in unheard of quantities by man-portable wire guided missiles (ATGMs), fired by Egyptian infantry. Subsequent analysis showed that Israeli forces had underestimated their opponents during the first phases of the war; their all-tank tactics ignored the newfound ability of Infantry armed with cheap AT weapons to stop tanks. The solution to this new battlefield environment was both tactical and technical. Tactically, there was renewed recognition for the need for combined-arms tactics. This led to greater mechanization of Infantry and advanced artillery tactics and warheads. Tanks alone were vulnerable to Infantry, but a combined team of tanks, mechanized Infantry, and mechanized artillery could still win in the new environment.

In 1974, the United States initiated an impressive programme to modernise its existing tank fleet and start real mass production of the M60A1, and later the M60A3; at the same time the M1 was developed. Budgets for tank design and production picked up during the administration of president Ronald Reagan, as the cold war threatened to get hot.

In response to infantry-portable and vehicle-mounted ATGMS, ever more capable defences were developed. Spaced armour, composite, explosive reactive armour, and active protection systems—like the Russian Shtora, Drozd, and Arena—were added to old and new tanks. Despite these improvements the larger missiles remained highly effective against tanks. This was demonstrated in 1991 when in a friendly fire incident, Hellfire anti-tank missiles destroyed one of the latest M1 Abrams tanks.