Tank Destroyer Battalion (United States) - Development of The Tank Destroyer Doctrine

Development of The Tank Destroyer Doctrine

In the opening offensives of the Second World War, the German doctrine of blitzkrieg—armored forces concentrated and used in a fast-moving offensive—shocked military observers. Even to armies which had previously experimented with large-scale mechanized warfare, the effects were remarkable; the collapse of Poland in 1939, followed by the defeat of the French Army and the British Expeditionary Force in France in 1940, gave rise to an impression that massed tank forces were effectively invincible when used against unprepared defenders.

Experience showed that neither infantry, anti-tank guns, or tanks, when used statically could withstand the deep envelopment maneuvers of armored "spearheads". The American armed forces, aware of the possibility of war against Germany, began to reorganize to meet this threat.

In April 1941, a conference focused on the future of antitank operations. The immediate effect was to create an anti-tank battalion in infantry divisions, but this organic anti-tank capacity was not deemed sufficient. The conference gave broad support to the idea of creating mobile anti-tank defensive units (commanded by corps or army formations) which could be deployed to meet an armored attack. The effort stalled on the issue of which branch of the Army should control it—the infantry (as a defensive role), the cavalry (as a mobile response force), or the artillery (as heavy guns). Interestingly, the armored branch did not press for control of the anti-tank units, feeling that it would be at odds with their general principles of maintaining the offensive. In May, General George C. Marshall cut through the knot by declaring the issue as sufficiently important to be dealt with as a combined-arms organization, forming an Anti-Tank Planning Board headed by Lt. Col. Andrew D. Bruce, and appointing Brigadier General Lesley J. McNair to take immediate action on organizing anti-tank forces. Three anti-tank "groups" were quickly organized, with each of three anti-tank battalions drawn from infantry divisions and various support units, and tasked with "speedy and aggressive action to search out and attack opposing tanks before they had assumed formation". In August, a plan was laid out for a program of 220 anti-tank battalions.

The first nine units were deployed during the Louisiana Maneuvers of 1941, equipped with towed 37 mm anti-tank guns and 75 mm guns mounted on half-tracks (the M3 GMC), and again in the Carolinas maneuvers that November. Their employment was judged a success—though not without some disgruntled voices in the armored branch arguing that the umpires had rigged the results—and on 27 November, Marshall ordered the establishment of a Tank Destroyer Tactical Firing Center at Fort Hood, Texas, under Bruce, and the activation of 53 new anti-tank battalions under the command of General Headquarters. The term "tank destroyer" was used from this point on, as more psychologically powerful. On 3 December, all existing anti-tank battalions were reassigned to General Headquarters and converted to tank destroyer battalions. The new tank destroyer doctrine was formally stated in Field Manual 18-5, Tactical Employment, Tank Destroyer Unit, in June 1942. It laid down a focused doctrine—"There is but one objective of tank destroyer units… the destruction of hostile tanks"—and repeatedly emphasized an offensive, vigorous spirit. Tank destroyer units were expected to be employed as complete battalions, held in reserve and committed at critical points, rather than parceled out as small defensive strongpoints. The emphasis was heavily on mobility, and the ability to outmaneuver the attacking armor; this would feed into vehicle design, and cause the speed and power of a vehicle to be prioritized over survivability or—to a degree—firepower.

One side-effect of the new status of the tank destroyer force was that, as a fully-fledged independent branch, it was required by War Department policy to establish units manned by African Americans—the United States Army remained racially segregated until the Korean War, but the War Department placed pressure on the Army to ensure that a fair proportion of combat units were black. Two of the initially converted battalions were black, with another four created in 1942 and four (of a planned six) in 1943. Several would eventually see combat, and one would become the first black unit to receive a Distinguished Unit Citation.