Supranational Union - Supranationalism in The European Union

Supranationalism in The European Union

Historically the concept was introduced and made a concrete reality by Robert Schuman when the French Government agreed to the principle in the Schuman Declaration and accepted the Schuman Plan confined to specific sectors of vital interest of peace and war. Thus commenced the European Community system beginning with the European Coal and Steel Community. The six founder States, (France, Italy, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg) agreed on the goal; making 'war not only unthinkable but materially impossible'. They agreed about the means: putting the vital interests, namely coal and steel production, under a common High Authority, subject to common democratic and legal institutions. They agreed on the European rule of law and a new democratic procedure.

The five institutions (besides the High Authority) were a Consultative Committee (a chamber representing civil society interests of enterprises, workers and consumers), a parliament, and a Council of government ministers. A Court of Justice would decide disputes coming from governments, public or private enterprises, consumer groups, any other group interests or even an individual. A complaint could be lodged in a local tribunal or national courts, where appropriate. Member States have yet to fulfill and develop the articles in the Paris and Rome treaties for full democracy in the European Parliament and other institutions such as the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of Regions.

Schuman described supranational unions as a new stage in human development. It contrasted with destructive nationalisms of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries that began in a glorious patriotism and ended in wars. He traced the beginning concept of supranationality back to the nineteenth century, such as the Postal Union, and the term supranational is used around the time of the first world war. Democracy, which he defined as 'in the service of the people and acting in agreement with it,' was a fundamental part of a supranational community. However, governments only began to hold direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, and then not according to the treaties. A single electoral statute was specified in the treaty for Europe's first community of coal and steel in 1951. Civil society (largely non-political) was to have its own elected chamber in the Consultative Committees specific to each Community as democratically agreed, but the process was frozen (as were Europe's parliamentary elections) by Charles de Gaulle and other politicians who opposed the Community method.

Today supranationalism only exists in the two European Communities inside the EU: the Economic Community (often called the European Community although it does not legally cover all State activities) and Euratom (the European Atomic Energy Community, a non-proliferation community, in which certain potentialities have been frozen or blocked.) Supranational Communities provide powerful but generally unexploited and innovatory means for democratic foreign policy, by mobilizing civil society to the democratically agreed goals of the Community.

The first Community of Coal and Steel was agreed only for fifty years. Opposition, mainly by enterprises which had to pay a small European tax of less than one percent and government ministers in the Council, led to its democratic mandate not being renewed. Its jurisprudence and heritage remains part of the European Community system.

De Gaulle attempted to turn the European Commission into a political secretariat under his control in the Fouchet Plan but this move was thwarted by such democrats in the Benelux countries as Paul-Henri Spaak, Joseph Luns and Joseph Bech as well as a large wave of other pro-Europeans in all the Community countries.

The supranational Community method came under attack not only by de Gaulle but other nationalists and Communists. In the post-de Gaulle period, rather than holding pan-European elections under a single statute as specified in all the treaties, governments held and continue to hold separate national elections for the European Parliament. These often favor the major parties and discriminate against smaller, regional parties. Rather than granting elections to organized civil society in the consultative committees, governments created a three pillar system under the Amsterdam Treaty and Maastricht Treaty, mixing intergovernmental and supranational systems. Two pillars governing External policy and Justice and Home affairs are not subject to the same democratic controls as the Community system.

In the Lisbon Treaty and the earlier nearly identical Constitutional Treaty, the democratic independence of the five key institutions is further breached and blurred. This moves the project from a full democratic supranationalism into the direction, not only of intergovernmentalism but the politicization of the institutions and control by two or three major party political organizations. The Commission defines key legal aspects of the supranational system because its members are to be independent not only of commercial, labour, consumer, political or lobby interests (Article 9 of the Paris Treaty). The Commission was to be composed of a small number of experienced personalities, whose impartiality was beyond question. As such the early presidents of the Commission and the High Authority were strong defenders of European democracy against national, autocratic practice or the rule of the strong over the weak.

The idea in the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties is to run the European Commission as a political office. Governments would prefer to have a national member in the Commission, although this is against the principle of supranational democracy. (The original concept was that the Commission should act as a single impartial college of independent, experienced personalities having public confidence. One of the Communities was defined in the treaty with a Commission with less members than the number of its Member States.) Thus the members of the Commission are becoming predominantly party political, and composed of sometimes rejected, disgraced or unwanted national politicians.

The first president of the High Authority was Jean Monnet who never joined a political party, as was the case with most of the other members of the Commissions. They came from diverse liberal professions, having made recognized European contributions.

Governments also wish to retain the secrecy of their deliberations in the Council of Ministers or the European Council, which discusses matters of the most vital interest to European citizens. While some institutions such as the European Parliament have their debates open to the public, others such as the Council of Ministers and numerous committees are not. Schuman wrote in his book, 'Pour l'Europe' (For Europe) that in a democratic supranational Community the Councils, committees and other organs should be placed under the control of public opinion that was effectual without paralyzing their activity nor useful initiatives.