Sinking of Prince of Wales and Repulse - Hostilities Commence

Hostilities Commence

Mitsubishi G3M Nell of Genzan Air Group. The type was also operated by Mihoro Air Group

Early in the morning of 8 December 1941, bombers of Mihoro Air Group attacked Singapore. Prince Of Wales and Repulse responded with anti-aircraft fire; no planes were shot down, and the ships sustained no damage. The Japanese made landings on Kota Bharu, Malaya, on 8 December (local time), and the British land forces were hard pressed.

Around that time, news came that Pearl Harbor had been attacked and eight U.S. battleships had been sunk or disabled. Pre-war planning had presumed that the U.S. Pacific Fleet would have moved to Singapore to reinforce the British when war broke out. That was now impossible. Philips had concluded in an earlier discussion with U.S. General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Thomas C. Hart that his two capital ships were of insufficient strength to confront the Japanese. However, with the Japanese threatening to overrun Malaya, Philips was pressed to use his ships in an offensive role; he assembled his flotilla to try to intercept and destroy Japanese invasion convoys in the South China Sea.

Admiral Philips believed the Royal Air Force could not guarantee air cover for his ships, as they were equipped with limited numbers of aging fighters. One squadron, No. 453 Squadron RAAF with Brewster Buffalos standing by at RAF Sembawang, was available to provide close cover. They were designated the Fleet Defence Squadron for this task, with Flight Lieutenant Tim Vigors given the radio procedures used by Force Z. However, these planes were inferior to Japanese fighters and their airfields were already threatened by Japanese land attacks.

Regardless, Phillips elected to proceed. It is believed that four factors entered into his decision: he thought that Japanese planes could not operate so far from land, he thought that his ships were relatively immune from fatal damage via air attack, he was unaware of the quality of Japanese bombing and torpedo aircraft, and like many RN officers, Phillips underestimated the fighting abilities of the Japanese. Up to that point, no capital ship at sea had been sunk by air attack (the largest vessel sunk at sea solely by aircraft had been a heavy cruiser). His flagship, the Prince of Wales, did have one of the most advanced naval anti-aircraft systems of the time, the High Angle Control System, which demonstrated accurate long range radar directed AA fire during Operation Halberd in August and September 1941. However the extreme heat and humidity in Malayan waters rendered her AA FC radars unserviceable and her 2 pounder ammunition had deteriorated as well. Royal Air Force technicians were called in to examine the Prince's radars, but needed a week to effect repairs, and Force Z would be underway in a few days.

No. 453 Squadron RAAF, which was to provide air cover for Force Z, was not kept informed of the ships' position. No radio request for air cover was sent until one was sent by the commander of Repulse an hour after the Japanese attack began. Flight Lieutenant Tim Vigors proposed a plan to keep six aircraft over Force Z during daylight, but this was declined by Phillips. Vigors later commented, "I reckon this must have been the last battle in which the Navy reckoned they could get along without the RAF. A pretty damned costly way of learning. Phillips had known that he was being shadowed the night before, and also at dawn that day. He did not call for air support. He was attacked and still did not call for help." Daytime air cover off the coast was also offered by Wing Commander Wilfred Clouston of No. 488 Squadron RNZAF, but his plan, "Operation Mobile", was rejected.

Regarding Phillips' decision to proceed without air cover, naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison wrote:

Those who make the decisions in war are constantly weighing certain risks against possible gains. At the outset of hostilities Admiral Hart thought of sending his small striking force north of Luzon to challenge Japanese communications, but decided that the risk to his ships outweighed the possible gain because the enemy had won control of the air. Admiral Phillips had precisely the same problem in Malaya. Should he steam into the Gulf of Siam and expose his ships to air attack from Indochina in the hope of breaking enemy communications with their landing force? He decided to take the chance. With the Royal Air Force and the British Army fighting for their lives, the Royal Navy could not be true to its tradition by remaining idly at anchor.