Siege of Musa Qala - The Musa Qala Agreement

The Musa Qala Agreement

Despite an effective defense, Easy company's situation continued to deteriorate. During a period of 40 days, they had repelled over 100 attacks, but only six resupply flights were flown in during their stay, and they soon began to run low on ammunition. By September 8, the mortar team were down to thirty 81 mm rounds, and when the Minimi gunners ran out of link ammunition for their weapons, they were forced to spend long hours filling used belts with 5.56 mm rounds left over by the Danes.

Meanwhile, debate continued within the British command. Brigadier Butler was in favour of a rapid pullout from the Musa Qala, as the coalition presence,in his view, created an intolerable liability. Intelligence reports suggested the Taliban had identified the base's dependence on helicopter resupply, and they would try and destroy one, thereby gaining a resounding propaganda victory. Such an event would also have a disastrous effect on British public opinion, that was already unfavourable to the Afghan mission. Butler exposed his views to the new Chief of the General Staff of the British Army Sir Richard Dannatt, when he visited Afghanistan, and to the Permanent Joint Headquarters who left him free to make his own decision. Accordingly, on September 8, Easy Company received news that they would be withdrawing in the next few days. However the plan met with strong opposition from General Richards, who perceived that an unconditional withdrawal would be interpreted by the insurgents as an historical success comparable to the 19th century battle of Maiwand, when a British brigade was defeated by Afghan forces near Kandahar. Helmand's population would consider the British untrustworthy, and they would be encouraged to support the Taliban, if only to be on the winning side. Richards attempted to garner support from Sir Nigel Sheinwald, the Foreign Policy and Defence Adviser to the prime minister, and from Sir Jock Stirrup, the Chief of the Defence Staff. The move was also opposed by the Afghan government who viewed the abandonment of Musa Qala as a disaster.

Eventually the quandary was solved by the inhabitants of Musa Qala themselves, who wished to end the hardships caused by the siege. Much of the town centre had been destroyed in the fighting, and most of the population had fled to nearby villages, preventing them from trading, collecting their crops, or sending their children to school. On August 26, a woman and her child were killed in the bazaar during a firefight. The towns elders blamed the Taliban and the coalition equally for their suffering. First they turned to the insurgents, and tried to persuade them that only negotiations could break the deadlock. The Taliban, who had suffered heavily in their unsuccessful attempts to capture the District Centre, readily agreed. The elders then exposed their proposition to Governor Daoud, who passed it on to Brigadier Butler on September 12. The brigadier, after receiving confirmation that the insurgents were ready to accept the deal, ordered a cease-fire, that took effect at 9:41 pm.

The following day, a delegation of 60 elders visited the district centre in order to discuss the situation with Major Adam Jowett. The visit convinced Jowett that their plan was serious, and in the afternoon, a shura took place in the desert west of Musa Qala. The British were represented by Brigadier Butler, and by a Foreign Office representative. The elders were accompanied by men dressed in black, that Butler identified as Taliban, but who stayed in the background and took no part in the discussion. General Richards had insisted that if the ceasefire held out for one month, both sides could then withdraw, and leave control of the town to its inhabitants. The elders agreed, and promised to supply the garrison with food and water.

At first, Easy Company did not have much confidence in the truce, and they continued to strengthen their defenses, but Musa Qala remained peaceful, allowing the inhabitants to return to their normal activities. A 14-point plan drawn up by Governor Daoud for handing over Musa Qala to the elders was gradually implemented. According to this plan, the Flag of Afghanistan would continue to fly over the District Centre, while the elders would select 60 members of their families to form a local police force, and they would permit reconstruction and development projects to continue.

The extraction of Easy company from Musa Qala took place on October 13, by which time the Helmand Task Force had been taken over by 3 Commando Brigade, and Ed Butler had been replaced by Brigadier Jerry Thomas. Ensuring the safety of the withdrawal became the first large-scale offensive operation for the newly-arrived commandos, codenamed Operation Omer. By arrangement with the elders, Easy company were to be evacuated in Afghan "jingly " lorries, for which the elders had promised to guarantee safe passage, with an elder climbing onto each lorry. The operation went smoothly without a shot being fired, and the convoy was able to rendez-vous safely with the men of 42 Commando in the desert. The elders held a last shura with Major Jowett and Colonel Matt Holmes, the commanding officer of 42 Commando, who thanked them for their collaboration, and the permanent coalition presence in Musa Qala came to an end.