Security Dilemma - Offense-defense Theory

Offense-defense Theory

The offense-defense theory of Robert Jervis helps decide the intensity of the security dilemma. Jervis’ theory is prominent in the international security literature. Jervis uses four scenarios to describe the intensity of the security dilemma.

1. When offensive and defensive behaviour are not distinguishable but offense has an advantage – The security dilemma is “very intense”. The environment is “doubly dangerous”. Status quo states will behave in an aggressive manner and there will arise the possibility of an arms race. Chances of cooperation between states are low.
2. Where offensive and defensive behaviour are not distinguishable but defense has an advantage – The security dilemma is “intense” in explaining states’ behaviour but not as intense as in the first case. In such situation, a state might be able to increase its security without being a threat to other states and without endangering the security of other states.
3. Where offensive and defensive behaviour are distinguishable but offense has an advantage – The security dilemma is “not intense” though security issues do exist. Though the environment is safe, offensive behaviour has an advantage which might result in aggression at some future time.
4. Where offensive and defensive behaviour are distinguishable and defense has advantage – The security dilemma has little or no intensity. The environment is “doubly safe”. Since there is little danger of offensive action by other states, a state would be able to expend some of its defense budget and other resources on useful development within the state.

According to Robert Jervis, the technical capabilities of a state and its geographical position are two essential factors in deciding whether offensive or defensive action is advantageous. According to Jervis, at a strategic level technical and geographical factors are of greater favour to the defender. For example, in the 19th century railway and roads construction were rapidly changing the composition of capabilities of states to attack or defend themselves from other states. Thus, considerable effort in diplomatic relations and intelligence were specifically focused on this issue.

The spiral model identifies the next step in reasoning about states’ behaviour after identifying the intensity of the security dilemma. In particular, under given circumstances of the security dilemma, what steps might a threatened state take to derive advantage by attacking first. In other words, the spiral model seeks to explain war. In the spiral model of Robert Jervis, there are two reasons why a state might end up in war. “Preventative war” might take place as one state might decide to attack first when it perceives the balance of power shifting to the other side creating an advantage in attacking sooner rather than later as conditions may not be as favourable in the future as in the present. “Preemptive war” might take place as a state might decide to attack another state first to prevent the other state from attacking or to obstruct the other state’s attack because it fears the other state is preparing to attack.

The deterrence model is contrary to the spiral model, but also purports to explain war.While the spiral model presumes that states are fearful of each other, the deterrence model is based on the belief that states are greedy. Paul K. Huth divides deterrence into three main types:

1. Preventing armed attack against a country’s own territory (“direct deterrence”)
2. Preventing armed attack against the territory of another country (“extended deterrence”)
3. Using deterrence against a short-term threat of attack (“immediate deterrence”).

“Under some circumstances attempts at deterrence can “backfire” when a potential attacker misinterprets the state’s deterrence measures as a “prelude to offensive measures”. In such cases the security dilemma can arise generating perceptions of a “first strike advantage”. According to Huth “most effective deterrence policies are those that decrease the expected utility of using force while not reducing the expected utility of the status quo; optimally deterrent policies would even increase the utility of not using the force. “ It is more likely that deterrence will succeed if the attacker finds deterrence threat “credible” and a credible deterrence threat might not necessarily be a military threat.

According to Robert Jervis, the security dilemma can lead to arms races and alliance formation.