In logic, a rule of inference, inference rule, or transformation rule is the act of drawing a conclusion based on the form of premises interpreted as a function which takes premises, analyses their syntax, and returns a conclusion (or conclusions). For example, the rule of inference modus ponens takes two premises, one in the form of "If p then q" and another in the form of "p" and returns the conclusion "q". The rule is valid with respect to the semantics of classical logic (as well as the semantics of many other non-classical logics), in the sense that if the premises are true (under an interpretation) then so is the conclusion.
Typically, a rule of inference preserves truth, a semantic property. In many-valued logic, it preserves a general designation. But a rule of inference's action is purely syntactic, and does not need to preserve any semantic property: any function from sets of formulae to formulae counts as a rule of inference. Usually only rules that are recursive are important; i.e. rules such that there is an effective procedure for determining whether any given formula is the conclusion of a given set of formulae according to the rule. An example of a rule that is not effective in this sense is the infinitary ω-rule.
Popular rules of inference include modus ponens, modus tollens from propositional logic and contraposition. First-order predicate logic uses rules of inference to deal with logical quantifiers. See List of rules of inference for examples.
Read more about Rule Of Inference: The Standard Form of Rules of Inference, Axiom Schemas and Axioms, Example: Hilbert Systems For Two Propositional Logics, Admissibility and Derivability
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