Randomization
prelink will (when run with the "-R" option) randomly select the address base that libraries are loaded at. This makes it more difficult to perform a return-to-libc attack on the system, because the addresses used are unique to that system. The reason prelink does this is because kernel facilities supplying address space layout randomization for libraries cannot be used in conjunction with prelink without defeating the purpose of prelink and forcing the dynamic linker to perform relocations at program load time.
As stated, prelink and per-process library address randomization cannot be used in conjunction. In order to avoid completely removing this security enhancement, prelink supplies its own randomization; however, this does not help a general information leak caused by prelink. Attackers with the ability to read certain arbitrary files on the target system can discover where libraries are loaded in privileged daemons; often libc is enough as it is the most common library used in return-to-libc attacks.
By reading a shared library file such as libc, an attacker with local access can discover the load address of libc in every other application on the system. Since most programs link to libc, the libc library file always has to be readable; any attacker with local access may gather information about the address space of higher privileged processes. Local access may commonly be gained by shell accounts or Web server accounts that allow the use of CGI scripts, which may read and output any file on the system. Directory traversal vulnerabilities can be used by attackers without accounts if CGI script vulnerabilities are available.
Because prelink is often run periodically, typically every two weeks, the address of any given library has a chance of changing over time. prelink is often used in an incremental mode in which already prelinked libraries are not altered unless absolutely necessary, so a library may not change its base address when prelink is re-run. This gives any address derived a half-life of the period in which prelink is run. Also note that if a new version of the library is installed, the addresses change.
Jakub Jelínek points out that position independent executables ignore prelinking on Red Hat Enterprise Linux and Fedora Core, and recommends that network and SUID programs be built PIE to facilitate a more secure environment.
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