Moral Realism

Moral realism is the meta-ethical view which claims that:

Ethical sentences express propositions.
Some such propositions are true.
Those propositions are made true by objective features of the world, independent of subjective opinion.

This makes moral realism a non-nihilist form of cognitivism. Moral realism stands in opposition to all forms of moral anti-realism, including ethical subjectivism (which denies that moral propositions refer to objective facts), error theory (which denies that any moral propositions are true), and non-cognitivism (which denies that moral sentences express propositions at all). Within moral realism, the two main subdivisions are ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism.

According to Richard Boyd, moral realism means that:

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Moral statements are the sorts of statements which are (or which express propositions which are) true or false (or approximately true, largely false, etc.);
The truth or falsity (approximate truth...) of moral statements is largely independent of our moral opinions, theories, etc.;
Ordinary canons of moral reasoning—together with ordinary canons of scientific and everyday factual reasoning—constitute, under many circumstances at least, a reliable method for obtaining and improving (approximate) moral knowledge.

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One study found that most philosophers today accept or lean towards moral realism, as do most meta-ethicists, and twice as many philosophers accept or lean towards moral realism as accept or lean towards moral anti-realism. Some examples of robust moral realists include David Brink, John McDowell, Peter Railton, Geoffrey Sayre-McCord, Michael Smith, Terence Cuneo, Russ Shafer-Landau, G.E. Moore, John Finnis, Richard Boyd, Nicholas Sturgeon, Thomas Nagel, and Plato. Norman Geras has argued that Karl Marx was a moral realist.

Read more about Moral Realism: Robust Versus Minimal Moral Realism, Science and Moral Realism, Advantages, Criticisms