Malayan Campaign - Background

Background

Between the wars, Britain's military strategy in the Far East was undermined by a lack of attention and funding. The British government's plans relied primarily on the stationing of a strong fleet at the Singapore Naval Base in the event of any enemy hostility, in order to defend both Britain's Far Eastern possessions and the route to Australia. A strong naval presence was also thought to act as a deterrent against possible aggressors. By 1940, however, the army commander in Malaya, Lieutenant-General Lionel Bond conceded that a successful defence of Singapore demanded the defence of the whole peninsula, and that the naval base alone would not be sufficient to deter a Japanese invasion. The defence strategy rested on two basic assumptions: first, that there would be sufficient early warning of an attack to allow for reinforcement of British troops, and second, that American help was at hand in case of attack. By late 1941, it became clear that neither of these assumptions had any real substance.

Once the Second World War commenced, Britain and the Middle East received higher priorities in the allocation of men and material. The desired Malayan air force strength of 300–500 aircraft was never reached. When the Japanese invaded, they had over 200 tanks, consisting of the Type 95 Ha-Go, Type 97 Chi-Ha, Type 89 I-Go and Type 97 Te-Ke. Commonwealth troops were equipped with the Lanchester 6x4 Armoured Car, Marmon-Herrington Armoured Car, Universal Carrier and only 23 obsolete light tanks, none of which were sufficiently armed for armoured warfare. The British had plans for a pre-emptive invasion of southern Thailand, named Operation Matador, to forestall Japanese landings, but decided not to use them.