Overview
The small engine policy was, perhaps, carried on too long, giving rise to the derisive poem:
M is for Midland with engines galore
Two on each train and asking for more
The Midland was blessed, in that George Stephenson had built its main lines with very shallow gradients. The LNWR had to cope with the hilly country north of Manchester. The Midland had also found it more efficient to use smaller, less fuel hungry locos, simply adding pilots or banking engines as necessary.
The small engine policy served the Midland well when its network was confined to the English Midlands, which is largely free of steep gradients. As the company expanded into other parts of Britain the policy's downsides began to cause problems. The company's own main line to Scotland (the Settle-Carlisle Line) and the Somerset and Dorset Joint Railway (where the Midland was responsible for providing locomotives) were renowned for their steep gradients and the company's locomotive stock proved badly suited to the task. Nonetheless the small engine policy remained and double-heading or banking was used to make up for the shortfall in power. This indirectly caused two accidents on the Settle-Carlisle Line (at Hawes Junction and Ais Gill) where trains stalled due to insufficient power, even from multiple locomotives. The policy also greatly reduced capacity on the Midland's network as not only were there more (but smaller) trains than there would have been on another railway but further capacity was taken up by the need to accommodate light engines that had been used for piloting or banking duties that were returning to their depots.
The small engine policy remained in place into the 1920s and remained an influence during the early years of the Midland's successor the London, Midland and Scottish Railway, its Chief Mechanical Engineer for most of the 1920s being Henry Fowler, a long-standing Midland engineer and former CME of that company.
Read more about this topic: Locomotives Of The Midland Railway