Lewis Strauss - Strauss and Oppenheimer

Strauss and Oppenheimer

During his term as an AEC commissioner, Strauss became hostile to J. Robert Oppenheimer, the physicist who had been scientific director of the Manhattan Project.

In 1947, Strauss, then a trustee of the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, presented Oppenheimer with the Institute's offer to be its director. But Strauss, a conservative Republican, had little in common with Oppenheimer, a liberal who had had Communist associations. Oppenheimer opposed H-bomb research and proposed a national security strategy based on nuclear weapons and continental defense; Strauss favored the development of thermonuclear weapons and a doctrine of deterrence. Oppenheimer favored a policy of "candor" regarding the numbers and capabilities of the atomic weapons in America's arsenal; Strauss believed such unilateral frankness would benefit no one but Soviet military planners.

When Eisenhower offered Strauss the AEC chairmanship, Strauss named one condition: that Oppenheimer would be excluded from all classified atomic work. Oppenheimer then sat on the General Advisory Committee (GAC) of senior atomic scientists which reported to the AEC, and held a Q clearance. He was one of the most respected figures in atomic science, even briefing the President and National Security Council in 1953.

Strauss, however, deeply distrusted Oppenheimer. He had become aware of Oppenheimer's former Communist affiliations (before World War II), and questionable behavior during the war, and began to think that Oppenheimer might even be a Soviet spy. Strauss was also suspicious of Oppenheimer's tendency to downplay Soviet capabilities. In 1953 Oppenheimer stated in the July edition of Foreign Affairs that he believed the Soviets were "about four years behind" in atomic weapons development. The U.S. had exploded the first thermonuclear device the previous year, although it required a two-story building filled with refrigeration equipment to chill the liquid hydrogen. Yet only a month after Oppenheimer made his proclamation, in August 1953, the Soviet Union declared, and U.S. sensors confirmed, that it had tested its own hydrogen bomb. (It was not, however, a staged thermonuclear weapon of the Teller-Ulam design. Scholars have debated for some time whether the Soviet Joe 4 device should be considered a true hydrogen bomb. The first Soviet test of an undisputedly "true" hydrogen bomb was not until 1955.) Moreover, the Soviet device relied on solid lithium-6 deuteride rather than liquid hydrogen to boost the yield, making the Soviet device the first truly deliverable thermonuclear weapon and exposing the Americans as the country trailing technologically.

In September 1953, Strauss, hoping to uncover evidence of Oppenheimer's disloyalty, asked FBI director J. Edgar Hoover to initiate surveillance to track Oppenheimer's movements. Hoover agreed enthusiastically. The tracking uncovered no evidence of disloyalty but did reveal Oppenheimer had lied to Strauss about his reason for taking a trip to Washington (Oppenheimer met a journalist rather than visit the White House as he had told Strauss). Strauss' suspicions increased further with the discovery that Oppenheimer had tried to stop America's long-range detection system in 1948 and 1949, which was the time frame when the Soviet Union exploded its first atomic weapon. In December 1953, the FBI notified Strauss that it would not watch Oppenheimer more closely without a specific request, which Strauss provided. Hoover then ordered full surveillance on Oppenheimer, including illegally tapping his phones.

At first Strauss moved cautiously, even heading off an attack on Oppenheimer by Senator Joseph McCarthy. He had the AEC staff compile a list of charges, and surprised Oppenheimer with them in December 1953.

Strauss is perhaps most remembered as the driving force in the month-long hearings, held in April and May 1954, before an AEC Personnel Security Board that resulted in Oppenheimer's security clearance being revoked. Strauss had access to the FBI's information on Oppenheimer, including his conversations with his lawyers, which was used to prepare counterarguments in advance. In the end, despite the support of numerous leading scientists and other prominent figures, Oppenheimer was stripped of his clearance as Strauss had wanted. Strauss was painted as a witch-hunter, pursuing a vendetta fueled equally by personal dislike and paranoid suspicions.