Koowarta V Bjelke-Petersen - Arguments

Arguments

Koowarta presented a case to the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission opposing the policy enacted by the Queensland Government, to block Aboriginal acquisition of large areas of land, arguing that it was discriminatory under sections 9 and 12 of the Racial Discrimination Act 1975. Section 9 makes it unlawful for any person to make a distinction based on race which interferes with another person's human rights. Section 12 makes it unlawful for any person to refuse to sell land to another person, or refuse to allow them to occupy the land, based on their race.

Bjelke-Petersen, on behalf of the Queensland Government, argued that the Racial Discrimination Act was not valid, and that the Australian Government had no power to make it. Section 51 of the Australian Constitution defines the powers of the Australian Government, and Bjelke-Petersen argued that subsection xxvi of that section, which allows the Parliament of Australia to make laws for "the people of any race, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws," did not apply to the Act, since it prohibited discrimination against people of all races.

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